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Introduction 
On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the son of a wealthy 
Nigerian banker, boarded Northwest Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. As the plane 
made its final descent, Abdulmutallab proceeded to ignite high explosive powder sewn 
into his underwear. Though the attack was thwarted by quick thinking passengers, it 
raised significant questions about how the well-to-do 23 year old Nigerian man had 
crossed into the world of violent extremism, and more importantly, how the US 
intelligence community failed to identify and prevent what would have undoubtedly 
ended as the deadliest attack on the US since 9/11. But Abdulmutallab is far from unique. 
Indeed Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the US Army psychiatrist responsible for the Fort 
Hood shootings a month earlier, is of an ‗atypical‘ background. What is most revealing 
about Abdulmutallab‘s case is neither his background nor the seemingly apparent failure 
of US intelligence. Rather, the case illustrates the ability of one of Al Qaeda‘s latest 
branches in its broader organization, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, to operate at a 
global level.    
Since 9/11, the transnational terrorist group known as Al Qaeda continues to 
thrive despite efforts by the U.S. government and its allies to disrupt it. As Al Qaeda 
central recedes in command, control, and operational capabilities, the organization has 
become increasingly decentralized, with offshoots reaching globally from South East 
Asia, Central Europe and Eurasia, to Africa, Western Europe and the U.S. Likened by 
many as a global franchise, a venture capital firm, a contagious virus, or the ‗McDonalds 
of terrorism‘, it continues to inspire and spread its radical agenda worldwide. News 
headlines of terrorist attacks from Mumbai to London are quickly followed by suspected 
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‗Al Qaeda involvement‘. But how important is Al Qaeda‘s role in these disparate 
operations? While some argue that Al Qaeda has receded in importance entirely, others 
claim that the organization very much continues to exist and thrive. Nine years after the 
commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, there is still much 
uncertainty about the constantly evolving nature of this transnational threat.  
 Gaining an understanding of how Al Qaeda expands, and to what degree it 
actually maintains influence around the world is crucial in understanding how and where 
to combat it. Al Qaeda‘s global operational strategy is aimed at provoking the 
overreaction of its enemies into a prolonged conflict that will alienate them from the 
masses. More importantly, the Al Qaeda model serves as a potential operational blueprint 
for other jihadist, criminal, or terrorist groups. Understanding this organizational 
blueprint is vital in combating tomorrow‘s enemies, including other activist, terror, and 
criminal groups which already are copying this model.
1
 
 Solving this problem raises significant questions. What is Al Qaeda‘s 
organizational structure today and how do we characterize it? Historically, where, how 
and why has it expanded, and which countries and regions are susceptible to the presence 
of the Al Qaeda in the future? More specifically, what are the social, economic, 
demographic, and political conditions that are conducive to the presence of Al Qaeda? If 
Al Qaeda recedes in importance or is eliminated entirely, what is the likelihood that its 
local franchises will continue Al Qaeda‘s global struggle? It is these questions that I hope 
to answer.  
                                                          
1
 David Kilcullen, "Counter-insurgency Redux," Survival 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 114. 
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As this analysis will argue, Al Qaeda has evolved into an increasingly diffuse, 
franchised organization whose arms are poised to operate with limited operational 
direction from senior Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Al Qaeda is 
capable of extending its influence and operations throughout both the developing and 
developed worlds. As Al Qaeda‘s adventure in Yemen illustrates, by exploiting domestic 
unrest, tribal grievances, and lack of central governance, the organization has established 
a well integrated, visible, and organized local presence in the form of Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While no single factor can explain Al Qaeda‘s rise in 
Yemen, Al Qaeda‘s ability to exploit tribal alliances and weave its global narrative into 
local concerns appears to be the most significant variable. It is no surprise then that 
National Counter Terrorism Center Director Michael Leiter recently judged AQAP to be 
not only the most operationally active arm of Al Qaeda, but also the biggest threat to the 
homeland.
2
  
In developed countries where Al Qaeda is denied a visible presence, the 
organization relies on a limited number of covert cells, grassroots followers, and affiliates 
to operate and recruit. Specifically in the UK, Al Qaeda exploits familial ties, political 
and social grievances, existing jihadist networks, and loopholes in national civil law to 
conduct operations and recruit. Al Qaeda‘s capacity to influence a much broader 
audience, including American citizens, at the grassroots level via its Salafist inspired 
ideology and exploitation of the global media are essential in this regard. Despite this, Al 
Qaeda‘s global appeal is dwindling, both due to its grandiose objectives as well as its 
                                                          
2
 Marc Thiessen, "Al-Qaeda's American-bred Leadership," Washington Post, March 10, 2011. 
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collateral damage to the Muslim world. However, even in the absence of an Al Qaeda 
identity, it is likely that these groups will continue to operate at a global level. 
Thus, there is not a single set of environmental variables that predict where Al 
Qaeda will be able to establish a presence. As the case studies in this thesis illustrate, at 
minimum, Al Qaeda is able to maintain an ideological presence, anywhere in the world. 
Not only does this follow from the organization‘s professed belief that it serves as the 
vanguard of the global jihadist movement, but it serves an important strategic purpose as 
well. As Osama bin Laden stated in 2004: ―All we have to do is to send two mujahidin to 
the furthest point East to raise a cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the 
[U.S.] generals race there to cause America to suffer…‖3 Al Qaeda‘s connections to 
affiliated insurgencies, grassroots jihadists, and regional branches makes it nearly 
impossible to separate Al Qaeda ―members‖ from the international jihadist herd. 
 While lack of governance, domestic unrest, and the presence of preexisting 
jihadist networks allow Al Qaeda to establish visible and well organized operations in a 
given country, this is not always the case. Even with these variables present, incompatible 
ideologies or tactics can prevent Al Qaeda from establishing anything more than a limited 
‗supportive‘ presence. In countries that lack these negative environmental variables, (i.e. 
those that are well governed, lack domestic unrest, and have few if any jihadist networks) 
Al Qaeda still manages to exploit positive factors such as freedom of speech (access to 
the internet), loopholes in civil laws, or familial connections abroad.  
Organization 
                                                          
3
 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 29. 
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The first chapter introduces prominent organizational and networking theories 
that provide the analytic context for evaluating Al Qaeda‘s historical and projected 
evolution. The basic network models proposed by David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, as 
well as the role of technology and the internet in facilitating communication within 
decentralized networks are also examined. Recent adaptations of networking models, 
including franchising theory and business organizational models, and the conditions 
necessary for sustaining an effective and operational network are considered. The second 
half of the chapter looks at some of the baseline conditions that encourage the presence of 
terrorist groups. This will build off of related research by the RAND Corporation which 
examines various environmental factors that are conducive to the presence of terrorist 
groups. 
Chapter Two places the Al Qaeda organization within the networking theories 
previously described. It will be shown that Al Qaeda is organizationally diffuse, 
consisting of three main arms including regional branches, a grassroots network of 
ideologically inspired followers, and affiliated insurgent movements. As the core of Al 
Qaeda‘s once centralized command and control group fades, the arms of the broader Al 
Qaeda organization are poised to assume independent operations. Chapter Two will also 
look at how Al Qaeda expands, the group‘s global strategy, ideological base, use of 
global media, and organizational weaknesses.  
Chapter Three examines AQAP, one of the latest regional branches to emerge 
within the broader Al Qaeda organization. AQAP is well organized, hierarchical, and 
exercises centralized command and control. Learning from its organizational failures in 
other theaters of operation, Al Qaeda has succeeded in establishing a well integrated 
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presence in Yemen capable of operating independently at a global level. Thus the case 
study of AQAP in Yemen is illustrative of the environmental and operational needs of Al 
Qaeda when operating in more permissive countries. Though AQAP faces serious long 
term strategic challenges, it will likely continue to target the US even in absence of its Al 
Qaeda identity. 
Chapters Four illustrates how Al Qaeda has established a limited presence in 
developed countries in which it is denied relatively unimpeded access. Al Qaeda has 
succeeded in recruiting, and to a lesser extent, operating in the United Kingdom (UK) 
through its broad organization, propaganda campaign, and by exploiting domestic social 
connections and political grievances. This chapter also suggests that a similar dynamic is 
currently playing out in the US. While Al Qaeda lacks the hierarchical command and 
control structure of AQAP and other regional affiliates in the West, it has nonetheless 
proven capable of directly controlling a limited number of cells there. However, as 
security and intelligence services crackdown on Al Qaeda‘s operations in the West, the 
organization is increasingly reliant on ideologically inspired followers who are 
unpredictable, unorganized, and lack operational direction.  
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Chapter 1: Networking Theories and the Conditions that are Conducive to the 
Presence of Terrorist Groups 
 Today‘s criminal and terrorist groups are increasingly diffuse and complex 
organizations, largely as a result of their exploitation of a new generation of 
communications technology and today‘s complex social environment. Although it is 
difficult to predict how any single network will evolve, understanding the nature of 
modern terrorist networks and how they interact with various environmental factors is 
vital in understanding Al Qaeda‘s current and projected evolution. After introducing 
some contemporary organizational models of criminal and terrorist networks, this chapter 
examines environmental factors that are conducive to the presence of terrorist groups.  
Networks 
Understanding the organizational dynamics of terrorist networks allows us to 
understand how these groups recruit, expand, and achieve sustainability.
1
 After 
presenting prominent networking models, this section looks at the role of the internet in 
maintaining internodal communication within these networks. Also considered are 
contemporary networking structures including business models, diffuse and dynamic 
networks, and the conditions necessary in maintaining organizational survival. 
Types of Networks 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, in their work Networks and Netwars, propose a 
concept called ―Netwar‖. In Netwar, separate groups or individuals will coordinate with 
one another utilizing various means of communication. Rather than free standing 
hierarchical organizations (with a centralized base) and formalized doctrines or strategies, 
                                                          
1
 Steve Ressler, "Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future 
Research," Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 2 (accessed October 30, 2010). 
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these groups are loosely connected factions.
2
 Netwar is a new type of warfare in which 
small dispersed groups ―communicate, coordinate and conduct their campaigns in an 
interconnected manner, without precise command and control‖.3  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt point to three general categories of networks, each with 
unique organizational characteristics. These are chain links, hub networks, and all-
channel full matrix networks. Chain networks generally rely on a bureaucratic structure 
with orders passing from top to bottom. One example is smuggling groups where 
communications, goods, and people, travel from one end to another. In hub networks 
(including, for example, franchises and cartels), actors (nodes) are tied to a central node 
from which they receive orders direction, and through which they can communicate to 
other nodes.
4
 Finally, all channel or full matrix networks are the most dispersed and least 
organized. All nodes are connected to each other, and there is no centralized leadership, 
command, or headquarters. Multiple leaders may exist and therefore decision making is 
decentralized as well. Operational directives can be issued from each cell, allowing for 
the maximum level of autonomy and local initiative. Locally grown ideas can be 
transmitted to the central hub, where they then receive approval or adjustment.
5
  
For a full matrix network to maintain effective performance and continued 
existence, shared ideologies (such as religion), principles, and operational doctrines that 
span all nodes are necessary. This ensures that all nodes, despite geographic dispersion, 
                                                          
2
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 6. 
3
 Ibid 30. 
4
 Ibid 7-8. 
5
 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 
164. 
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are of ―one mind‖.6 However, geographic dispersion of nodes can also impede the 
network‘s operational effectiveness as isolated components of the network can diverge 
from the intent of senior leadership without any intentional effort to modify tactics or 
strategy.
7
 A full matrix network can continue to function despite the loss of numerous 
nodes or leaders. As an organization becomes further decentralized, it also becomes 
harder to defeat.
8
 Although the organization is decentralized, leadership still remains 
important (especially at the local level).
9
 The ad hoc nature of these groups permits the 
practice of what Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe as ―swarming‖, where dispersed nodes 
can attack a given enemy from multiple points at once. This is an effective tactic and one 
that is actively employed by Al Qaeda.  
The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Communication within Decentralized Networks  
The internet and other forms global communication allow decentralized networks 
to maintain cohesiveness despite geographical dispersion, and this is particularly true of 
full matrix networks. Within these networks, communication and coordination is not 
formally specified in one particular way but rather changes according to new situations, 
and internal networks are complemented by linkages to individuals outside of the 
organization such as ideological affiliates. These internal and external ties are determined 
by shared norms and values rather than a bureaucracy.
10
 Given the characteristics of full 
matrix networks, constant communication is required for the organization to grow and 
                                                          
6
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 9. 
7
 Brian A. Jackson, "Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control Driven Approach to 
Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
(2006): 245 (accessed December 1, 2010). 
8
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 365. 
9
 Ibid, 327 
10
Ibid, 31 
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reach its full potential, however some groups can remain highly effective even without 
consistent communication. 
Communication between nodes ensures that the binding ideology of the group 
will remain intact.
11
 Modes of communication to accomplish this goal include everything 
from emails, cell phones, and faxes, to hand delivered correspondence.
12
 Cell phones and 
the internet have been used to recruit new members, coordinate attacks, and broadcast 
their ideology or message to target audiences. The internet in particular has reduced the 
need for face to face interaction, allowing groups to use online message boards and chat 
rooms to share information, such as strategy and operational tactics, or participate in 
virtual training grounds.  
The attractiveness of the internet stems primarily from its ease of use and access, 
little or no regulation, access to a global audience, and the instantaneous speed at which 
information can be transferred between members of the organization. Web pages are very 
cheap to operate, and can be used to display a variety of media forms.
13
 Web activity is 
also difficult to trace, especially as terrorists utilize steganography, encryption software, 
and various other means of clandestine operation, allowing them to operate in safety over 
the internet. This gives organizations the freedom to not only establish central websites, 
but allows individual nodes to develop their own websites and propaganda arms. Many 
criminal, militia, and extremist groups that were once isolated are becoming leaderless 
networks as a result. Before the advent of the internet, fanaticism of isolated jihadist or 
terrorist groups would have faded in absence of communication. Now access to shared 
                                                          
11
 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 158. 
12
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 10 
13
 Gabriel Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, Special Report 116, p. 3, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/ wwwterrornet-how-modern-terrorism-uses-internet. 
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communication technologies reinforces emotional and ideological support of these 
groups and their members.
14
 This has made terrorist networks extremely resilient, 
especially since online chat rooms and social networking media like Facebook and 
Twitter have essentially created virtual communities or havens that parallel physical 
organizations.
15
 However, despite the popularity of the internet as a training tool, some 
analysts argue that the benefits offered by physical training camps cannot be replaced by 
virtual ones.
16
 
Applying Business Models to Terrorist Groups 
 Unlike strictly hierarchical organizations, today‘s groups appear to be taking on 
businesslike organizational structures. Research by Aaron Zelinksy and Martin Shubik 
from Yale University highlight four different organizational models, including 
hierarchical, venture capital, franchise, and brand model groups. With centralized 
resources and operations, hierarchical groups exercise tight command and control, and 
require a large financial support base to maintain expansive projects.
17
 Hierarchical 
groups require a safe base of operations and physical security to protect senior leadership, 
and minimal knowledge is necessary to conduct operations at the nodal level. Unlike 
more decentralized groups, leadership at the top of the organizational hierarchy exercise 
direct control over operations and resources.
18
  
Venture capital groups exercise decentralized operations with centralized 
resources. These groups lack the central leadership and coordination necessary to oversee 
                                                          
14
 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 160 
15
 Ibid 161 
16
 Eben Kaplan, "Terrorists and the Internet," Council on Foreign Relations (accessed December 1, 2010). 
17
 Aaron Zelinsky and Martin Shubik, "Terrorist Groups as Business Firms: A New Typological 
Framework," Terrorism and Political Violence: 329 (accessed December 1, 2010). 
18
 Ibid 
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large scale operations such as training camps. Though they may fund organizations to set 
them up on their behalf, they do not retain operational control over them.
19
  
Franchise groups maintain centralized operations with decentralized resources. 
These organizations cannot maintain large scale operations, and are financially 
decentralized, with a central authority that is unable to directly fund programs or 
operations.   
Brand model groups exhibit an extremely low degree of centralization, with both 
decentralized operations and decentralized resources (likened to a social movement). It is 
important to note that this model represents the true franchise organization (taken in its 
literal definition), in that the main organization only provides rights or licenses to a local 
company that allow it to market the main corporation‘s product in a given area.20 These 
groups rely heavily on ideological self identification and ad-hoc cooperation. There is 
little if any contact amongst cells, and the terrorist trademark is what holds the 
organization together. Furthermore, brands can survive even if a number of the 
organization‘s nodes are destroyed. Because these groups have little organizational 
structure, they are unable to undertake long term planning and nodes have minimal 
communication with each other.
21
 Modern groups have the potential (as is the case with 
Al Qaeda) to shift between different models depending on outside pressures that may 
disrupt the central hub or key leadership.
22
  
                                                          
19
 Ibid 
20
 Joshua McLaughlin, "The al Qaeda Franchise Model: An Alternative," Small Wars Journal (blog), 
January 31, 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ 2010/01/the-al-qaeda-franchise-model-a/. 
21
 Aaron Zelinsky and Martin Shubik, "Terrorist Groups as Business Firms: A New Typological 
Framework," 330 
22
 Ibid 
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The model chosen has implications for how the group will expand.  In the case of 
venture capital groups, small companies can choose to expand their own business by 
merging with an international corporation. A larger international group can choose to 
enter a specific geographic area by buying out a smaller local company, while supplying 
a small number of its own employees to give strategic guidance. The larger corporation, 
despite offering limited guidance and funds, will allow the smaller company (now part of 
the larger international company) to operate independently.
23
 While the local company 
benefits from the added support, training, and financial assistance (not to mention greater 
international recognition), the global company has secured its own position in a strategic 
location, using the local company to achieve its own goals. Operating in this way, brand 
model groups (franchise organizations in the literal sense) may offer little more than 
inspiration, small funds, and ideology to other groups. 
Social Networking Theory and Diffuse Networks 
Beyond business models and franchising theories, an analytic model worth noting 
is social networking theory and its companion field Social Network Analysis (SNA). This 
model has shed light on the nature of more decentralized matrix networks. Social 
networking theory attempts to analyze the complex social relationships between 
dispersed nodes within full matrix networks.
24
 In contrast to strictly political and 
sociological approaches, social networking theory argues that the value of the network 
structure far outweighs the characteristics of the individual within the organization, in 
turn emphasizing bonds over leadership. By utilizing modern information sharing, these 
                                                          
23
 Joshua McLaughlin, "The Al Qaeda Franchise Model: An Alternative," Small Wars Journal 
24
 Steve Ressler, "Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future 
Research," Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 1-2 (accessed October 30, 2010). 
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multi-node social networks develop stronger social bonds between nodes than those in 
strictly hierarchical organizations.
25
  
By applying SNA to terrorism, Marc Sageman presents the global jihadist 
network; a large social network within which violent conservative Islam (Salafi jihadism) 
exists as the centrally shared ideology. The global Salafi jihadist movement can be 
divided into a number of smaller regional social networks (hubs), which are essentially 
independent grassroots groups that connect with each other via the internet.
26
 These hubs 
have the ability to independently operate and recruit.  
As Sageman argues, the Salafi movement is not a specific organization, but rather 
a social movement operated from the bottom up in contrast to more formalized 
networks.
27
 In this way, the global jihadist movement is essentially no different (in 
organizational structure) than other types of social movements. The amorphous nature of 
the Salafi jihadist network gives it the ability to form and break bonds with other radical 
groups at will.
28
 Although Salafism is central to the network‘s cohesive identity, it is far 
from being the sole determinant of the network‘s radical nature.  
Another type of social network is the tribal group, which, unlike larger social 
movements, relies on greater internodal cohesion. Similar to the Salafi jihadist movement 
in its dynamic nature, classic tribes differ in that their key organizing principle is kinship 
(nuclear and extended families and clans), rather than religion.
29
 A classic tribe can be 
tied to specific territories, can span various villages, and can number in the thousands. 
                                                          
25
 Ibid 
26
 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 
140 
27
 Ibid 142-143 
28
 Ibid 151 
29
 David Ronfeldt, Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare, RAND: Project 
Air Force, 36, accessed December 1, 2010. 
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Though lineage and ties through marriage are important for smaller tribes, fraternal 
associations and doctrinal orders play a more important role in larger ones.  
Despite variations in size between different tribal groups, kinship still remains the 
central component in binding all members together, and with tribal growth, becomes even 
more important (binding it like a full matrix network). Customs, codes, and religion are 
the primary means of keeping cohesion within the group. For example, warlords in many 
of the world‘s tribal zones (especially Central Asia and the Middle East), operate almost 
exclusively with the intent of bringing honor to the given tribe, and all individuals within 
the tribe strive to maintain good standing within the organization.
30
  
Other important aspects of tribes are that they are segmental (without internal 
operational specialization) and lack a central leader. Like franchise organizations, each 
unit within the tribe is identical to all others. Tribes can absorb or merge with another 
tribe based upon intermarriage, or can just as easily splinter apart (a village can separate 
from a tribe to form its own tribe). Classic tribes rarely have formal leaders or a single 
chief, and leadership changes tend to be low profile to discourage conflict.
31
 Operational 
decision making is often done in open council where all voices are heard. Tribes thus 
declare war as a whole, but tend to fight in splintered groups determined by village or 
geographic dispersion. Uniting against a common enemy is a key way for tribal groups to 
boost cohesion.
32
  
Dynamic Networks 
                                                          
30
 Ibid 36-37 
31
 Ibid 
32
 Ibid 38 
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 Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA), pioneered by Kathleen Carley at Carnegie 
Mellon University, studies large multi-nodal networks with constantly changing 
relationships. By using various computational tools, DNA maps the organizational trends 
of dynamic covert networks (such as terrorist groups). Whereas SNA considers more 
static items such as agent position within an organization, DNA considers changes in 
agent position including the ability of cells to communicate, store information, and 
adapt.
33
  
DNA has yielded a number of important conclusions regarding the characteristics 
of dynamic networks. Within dynamic networks, changes in the relations of nodes are 
extremely difficult to predict, though they generally occur for several reasons: cognitive 
(changes in what individuals know), social (dictated change in ties by authorities within 
the network), and political (legislation that affect the overall goals of the organization).
34
 
Dynamic networks are able to heal themselves, and the isolation of a single node that 
links disparate groups together is typically unable to disconnect them, due to the fact that 
they have the ability to seek alternative contact points.
35
 Splintering of the network can 
cause new more assertive leaders to emerge. How a network heals is dependent on the 
underlying cultural basis of the network, as well as the type and degree of isolation 
imposed upon it. However dynamic networks are able to heal themselves regardless of 
the isolation strategy used against them.
36
  
Maintaining Stability and Effectiveness within Networks 
                                                          
33
 Kathleen Carley, "Dynamic Network Analysis" (NRC Workshop on Social Network Modeling and 
Analysis), p.11. 
34
 Ibid, 8 
35
 Kathleen Carley et al., "Destabilizing Dynamic Covert Networks" (8th International Command and 
Control Research and Technology Symposium, Washington, D.C. 2003), Carnegie Mellon University, 
accessed April 4, 2011. 
36
 Kathleen Carley, ―Dynamic Network Analysis‖, 9 
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 Arquilla and Ronfeldt note four factors that are vital to the maintenance of a 
network‘s ability to operate: organization, narrative, doctrine, technological 
infrastructure, and social underpinnings. At the organizational level, diffuse groups such 
as full matrix networks, and especially dynamic networks, rely on autonomous cells and 
local leaders to operate without coordinating with the organization‘s central leadership. 
Without centralized command and control, the cohesive identity must be strong in the 
group or it will lose operational efficiency or break up. The narrative level is this 
cohesive identity and shared values of the group. It is the group‘s sense of ‗who we are, 
and why we are different from them.
37
 Narrative is also how the world sees the 
organization, say as freedom fighters, liberators, victims, etc., and therefore is necessary 
to maintain a support base. Doctrine includes the means of attack of the network (swarm 
tactics by attacking opponents using multiple nodes simultaneously) as well as how it 
operates.
38
 Technological infrastructure includes the network‘s access to technology, and 
its ability to exploit the internet, global telecommunications, or use low technology 
communications (such as face to face interactions between couriers). Finally, social 
underpinnings include how well various members of the network know each other. In 
purely social networks this is obviously an essential element, if not the entire modus 
operandi for the group. Again, nodes within a strictly hierarchical organization (such as a 
corporation) will relate to one another in a distinctly different way than nodes within a 
tribal group. Thus when determining how a network will operate, strong personal ties, 
friendship, as well as high or low degrees of interpersonal trust are essential to 
understand.  
                                                          
37
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 327 
38
 Ibid 328-329 
18 
 
Environmental Conditions that are Conducive to the Presence of Terrorist Groups  
 Having seen how contemporary criminal and terrorist networks operate, it is also 
important to understand the environmental conditions that permit the expansion and 
evolution of these networks. RAND‘s study, Ungoverned Territories highlights a number 
of important factors that are conducive to the presence of terrorist groups including: lack 
of governance, inadequate border security, exploitable infrastructure, the presence of 
subversive groups, favorable social and demographic factors, and invisibility. It is 
important to note that many of these factors are interrelated. For instance, while criminal 
networks or insurgent groups exist in failed states, or may even be a cause of state failure, 
they certainly exist in well governed states as well. Depending on what conditions are 
present, this has implications for what types of nodes will exist. Semi-permanent nodes 
(training camps) are more likely to emerge in the failed or failing state context, while 
temporary nodes (suicide bombers or operatives) are more likely to emerge in states that 
are not necessarily failing structurally, but offer an environment that permits smaller 
scale terrorist activities.
39
 
Lack of Governance and Border Security 
The single greatest indicators of lack of governance are dysfunctional or 
nonexistent state institutions. Due to geographic, economic, or resource constraints, law 
enforcement and military personnel may only be capable of maintaining an active 
presence in the country‘s urban areas, leaving outlying areas like rugged border regions 
largely un-policed. Areas that lack state security services typically lack state sponsored 
social services, like schools or hospitals. In such areas, state laws may have little effect (if 
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any) on the local populace, creating a vacuum for local criminals, smugglers, and 
insurgents to fill. These areas are often economically retarded as well.
40
 Corruption also 
flourishes in states suffering from inadequate governmental institutions, poverty, and/or 
political competition among sub-national identity groups. Terrorist organizations can 
exploit corrupt officials and the weakened governance to which they contribute.
41
    
 On this note, the inability of a state to retain control over its borders is an 
important indicator of lack of governance. Because border regions often reside far from 
the nation‘s capital, these areas are typically less governed and easily exploited by 
criminal, insurgent, or terrorist groups.
42
 In this regard, neighboring states may wish to 
exert influence within the given country, or to engage a spillover insurgent group that 
may be affecting the invading country‘s security, thereby further inhibiting the ability of 
the host country to establish effective governance within its borders.   
 It is important to note that the only true benefit of a failed state is the relative 
sanctuary it provides to terrorist groups, as state security forces are unable to combat 
these spoilers. Although failed or ungoverned states and open territories can offer 
terrorists the ability to exploit natural resources, illicit economies, weapons, establish 
training camps with little impunity, and coordinate logistics, they may not be close 
enough to potential targets to offer much operational use.
43
  
Exploitable Infrastructure and Illicit Economies 
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Access to infrastructure is an important requirement for terrorist groups. This 
includes access to communications, an official or unofficial banking system, and 
transportation networks that facilitate access to potential targets or urban centers.
44
 
Again, if a state lacks essential infrastructure elements like telecommunications or a 
formal economy, it is difficult, if not impossible, for nodes to coordinate logistics, and 
gather intelligence etc. Therefore operational access (such as proximity to Western 
embassies, military installations, urban areas) is important. Western Europe is a good 
example of this because, although it may not allow for large scale operations, it does 
permit relatively easy access to the United States. North African countries such as 
Morocco or Algeria offer relatively easy access to France and Spain.  
Also important is a source of income to fund terrorist operations, and can include 
both legal and illicit economies. Illicit economies, often relying on exploitation of natural 
resources, such as the illegal drug trade (poppies, cocoa), diamond smuggling, or human 
smuggling etc. is also great financial stream that terrorist groups can tap into. Depending 
on the economic resources available to the individual node, varying degrees of reliance 
are placed on legal and illicit sources of income. For instance, terrorist groups in the 
Arabian Peninsula rely heavily on charities and money laundering, while those in 
Afghanistan rely heavily on opium and human trafficking.
45
 Illicit economies can provide 
criminals, insurgents and other belligerents with numerous benefits.
46
 Various informal 
social assistance programs, such as NGOs and Islamic charity organizations also provide 
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funding for terrorist groups that is extremely difficult to track in states that are not 
necessarily failed or failing.
47
 
Presence of Insurgent and Criminal Groups 
Insurgent and criminal groups serve not only to challenge the state‘s authority and 
monopoly on the use of force, but provide terrorists with abundant operational resources. 
Armed subversive groups, such as local militias, insurgent groups, or criminal networks 
typically try to exert their own power within the state, and while some groups may leech 
off of state resources and institutions to fund their operations, others seek to either 
wholeheartedly undermine or replace them.
48
 Some insurgent groups, such as Pakistani 
Taliban have, in the absence of a state presence, sought to establish a certain degree of 
law and order where they are based, although they have not sought to establish any form 
of government.
49
 In Iraq as well, insurgent groups have established rudimentary local 
administrative systems, though in many instances they have failed to raise taxes and 
regulate daily life, an indication of their more destructive rather than productive 
potential.
50
 A number of insurgencies have become transnational in nature by linking up 
with groups in neighboring countries to share resources and operationally coordinate.
51
 
When these groups aggregate, they can invite foreign intervention, thereby further 
eroding the host nation‘s monopoly on the use of force. Again, in absence of effective 
national institutions within a state‘s borders, this creates vacuums that terrorist groups 
can exploit. 
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Criminal and insurgent movements also offer terrorist groups a source of 
recruitment, access to resources, and a means of state penetration. Given the potential for 
operational coordination between criminal and terrorist groups, it is easy for members of 
one group to quickly move into the other. This is especially true in Afghanistan where 
foreign fighters from the greater Central Asia have married into local clans or criminal 
networks, seemingly eliminating the divide between criminal, terrorist, and insurgent. 
Strategic alliances between criminal groups and terrorists can be mutually beneficial, 
allowing both to achieve mutual objectives using shared resources. Such objectives can 
be the destruction of the state government (or at the very least the weakening of it); 
similar logistical and operational requirements; and shared infrastructure (such as roads, 
financial and money laundering networks, illicit economies). In this regard, an abundant 
supply of weapons and munitions (resulting from civil unrest or insurgency) is also an 
invaluable resource for terrorists. This is the case in the Horn of Africa where booming 
illicit weapons markets, as a result of continuing civil war, have given terrorists a vast 
supply of small arms and explosives for use in various operations.
52
  
Social, Economic, and Demographic Factors 
Supportive or shared social norms, grievances, or ethno-religious cleavages 
between the terrorist group and the local population can also facilitate terrorist group 
penetration. Some of the strongest ties within an organization are the result of ethnic or 
religious connections, as is the case with tribal groups. At a religious level, both the 
terrorist group and local population may adhere to similar religious sects, allowing 
terrorists and insurgents easy penetration of these enclaves. However, and as Chapter 
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Two will illustrate, shared religion is not in and of itself conducive to the presence of 
terrorist groups.
53
 An example of supportive social norms can be found in Afghanistan 
where the Pashtun code of conduct requires that the host provide safe haven and 
protection for outsiders. Shared grievances could exist when a terrorist group seeks to 
expel Western influence or presence in a given region, and the local population of the 
given country wishes to expel Western military involvement in that particular country. 
Political discontent can emerge when citizens of the given state have limited participation 
in government, or are the victims of state violence. Individuals who are caught in the 
middle of violence between subversive groups and state security forces, may direct their 
anger at the state (or outside influence) by joining terrorist groups, creating operational 
quicksand for governments that wish to combat terrorism through the use of violence, as 
in Chechnya and the Russian Caucasus.
54
 
Economic depravity is also an indicator of societal discontent and violence, often 
by leading to perceptions of relative deprivation amongst citizens, who may in turn direct 
their anger toward the government or outside forces that they perceive as being the root 
cause of their problems. Extremist groups frequently tend to exist in underdeveloped 
regions, particularly East Africa, the Middle East, Eurasia, and East Asia, where poverty, 
bad governance, and poor social services are an inescapable part of everyday life. To 
people in these so-called ‗at risk societies‘, Westernization, secularization, consumerism, 
and free market capitalism represent significant ideological challenges, especially to 
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religiously conservative cultures.
55
 Inevitably in today‘s global economy, while some 
states have seen overwhelming economic gains (for example the UAE), others have seen 
the economic devastation of dwindling natural resources (Yemen). The result in these 
regions has been collective perceptions of relative deprivation: a sense of having been 
taken advantage of by the world economy. Individuals who are unemployed, lacking in 
formal education, or are socially alienated tend to seek out alternative sources of social 
and psychological stability.
56
 Small, radical religious or activist groups may provide this 
sense of stability. Countries that have experienced youth bulges tend to be more 
susceptible to the contagion of radical ideology. For this reason, foot soldiers within 
terrorist organizations and insurgent groups typically join in adolescence or their early 
twenties.
57
  
Invisibility 
Invisibility is also a highly important resource for terrorist groups. It is important 
to note that, as defined in this thesis, invisibility differs from sanctuary in that invisibility 
refers to the superficial ability of terrorists to remain hidden from authorities, though not 
necessarily maintain a long and durable presence. Invisibility can range from geographic 
isolation (as in the case of an ungoverned territory), anonymity, or the product of 
terrorists‘ ability to blend in socially, linguistically, and culturally into the host country.58 
Terrorist groups in Iraq have achieved invisibility in heavily urbanized areas and towns 
where population density and operational covers are abundant. Holy shrines in Iraq have 
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offered protection for insurgents and terrorists from pursuit by U.S. and Iraqi security 
forces. Though they may limit training capabilities, cities tend to offer a great deal of 
cover and support.
59
  
In developed Western countries, large heterogeneous cities offer diversity in 
language and culture, making assimilation unnecessary, especially in small immigrant 
circles. Small groups of likeminded individuals, such as Koran reading groups or 
members of Mosques, can meet in isolation from outside influence and threat from state 
security forces. Although these states may perform governance effectively, terrorists or 
criminals are able to exploit legal and social loopholes (including assembly rights, 
asylum laws, legal protections against unlawful search and seizure etc.), access to 
transportation among other things.
60
 When combined with access to the internet, and 
given that it is heavily exploited by terrorist groups to proliferate propaganda, urban safe 
havens can be just as or more effective than isolated training camps in remote regions. As 
mentioned before however, physical training camps offer education that internet 
recruiting simply cannot match. Risks to terrorist invisibility emerge due to the need for 
nodes to communicate with other nodes via phone, internet, or personal interaction. 
Conceivably, sleeper cells could reduce this risk by severing communication with other 
nodes, though doing so could greatly reduce the operational effectiveness of those cells. 
Again, terrorists will trade operational capacity for physical security and greater 
invisibility by moving to geographically isolated areas. In this sense, the invisibility 
                                                          
59  Michael Innes, Denial of Sanctuary (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 87. 
60 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe 
Havens," 19-20, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/ugash_report_final.pdf (accessed December 11, 2010). 
26 
 
offered by large cities with dense populations can be a greater attraction for terrorist 
groups that isolated areas for the aforementioned reasons. 
Conclusion 
  The study of organizational, business, and social networking models allows an 
understanding of the evolving nature of terrorist groups. Although difficult to predict, 
each structure has a different implication for how a group will evolve over time. Applied 
to international terrorism, while state failure is conducive to the presence of terrorist 
groups, other factors such as invisibility and favorable demographic factors allow these 
networks to find sanctuary in developed countries. The following chapters illustrate that 
the Al Qaeda organization has shifted through many of the aforementioned organizational 
types, and is able to exploit a variety of environmental conditions to penetrate both failed 
and developed states. The next chapter will contextualize Al Qaeda in light of these 
organizational and environmental factors. 
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Chapter 2: Al Qaeda’s fit into the Networking Model 
The international terrorist organization Al Qaeda was created in 1988 by Osama 
bin Laden, a wealthy former Saudi national, as a runoff of Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) 
which was organized to fight the Soviets during their occupation of Afghanistan from 
1979-1989. In recent years, Al Qaeda has become the equivalent of a ‗global clearing 
house‘ for terrorism, both by inspiring other non-affiliated radical groups as well as 
directly sponsoring its own terrorist cells. In this way, the broader Al Qaeda organization 
essentially functions as a sort of full matrix network, with nodes and subgroups that 
exhibit more centralized command and control. Shared mission and ideology are thus 
essential to maintaining cohesiveness across what is a highly diffuse organization. 
This chapter will first examine Al Qaeda‘s organizational structure, which 
incorporates a hybrid of grassroots followers, loosely controlled regional branches, and 
supportive affiliations with other radical Islamist movements.
1
 As the organization‘s hub 
group in Afghanistan and Pakistan, referred to as Al Qaeda central fades away, Al 
Qaeda‘s ideological network, affiliates, and regional branches are poised to assume 
independent control. Also examined are the ways that Al Qaeda expands 
organizationally, and some of the weakness of its structure. Next the chapter will look at 
Al Qaeda‘s global strategy, and particularly its ideological base which is central to 
maintaining stability and operational effectiveness across the diffuse Al Qaeda 
organization. While ideology allows Al Qaeda to resonate with a wide audience, it also 
limits the structural and operational integrity of the organization. Finally, this chapter will 
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look at how Al Qaeda utilizes the internet and global media both as a means of recruiting 
and communicating across the organization, and also as an operational tool. 
Al Qaeda and its Organizational Structure 
Al Qaeda‘s current structure is truly a hybrid one, combining both bottom up, and 
top down control. It incorporates many of the characteristics of a full matrix network in 
that it is highly decentralized and lacking in central command and control. Structurally, 
as Bruce Hoffman notes, the Al Qaeda organization consists of four dimensions: Al 
Qaeda central, Al Qaeda affiliates and associates, Al Qaeda regional branches, and an Al 
Qaeda network of grassroots followers.
2
  It is also important to look at how Al Qaeda 
establishes an integrated regional presence, as well as some of the inherent weaknesses of 
this organizational structure, particularly the operational autonomy granted to regional 
branches. This issue makes ideology  a key role in ensuring cohesiveness and operational 
unity across the organization. 
Al Qaeda Central 
Al Qaeda central remains the core of the Al Qaeda network. Based formerly in 
Afghanistan and now mostly in Pakistan, this Al Qaeda network has made a significant 
shift since the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks. From the late 1980s to mid 1990s, Al 
Qaeda functioned as a hierarchical system centered in Afghanistan where Bin Laden and 
his deputies exercised tight control over the organization. This included a 31 member 
consultative council ―Shura‖ that included military, religious affairs, financial and other 
sub-councils.
3
 During the mid to late 1990s, as a result of Al Qaeda‘s evolved mission to 
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wage jihad against the West, the organization changed focus from the ―near enemy‖ 
(Russia in Afghanistan) to the ―far enemy‖ (the US). This necessitated a shift from a 
more hierarchical command and control structure, to a ―venture capital‖ structure that 
utilized decentralized operations. In essence, this is the origin of the bottom up and top 
down planning and operations methodology.  Largely as a result of the disruption of Al 
Qaeda central‘s operations and communication, it has taken on a more consultative role.  
This has included providing financial and limited training and or materiel assistance to 
global jihadist affiliates.
4
 
Following US operations in Afghanistan in 2001 during Operation Enduring 
Freedom, Al Qaeda central lost some of its command and control capability over its 
regional franchises, resulting in the organization‘s transformation to a brand model, or 
social movement structure.
5
 Today‘s Al Qaeda central still includes the organization‘s 
key leaders, most notably Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al Qaeda central 
operates mostly in Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where it 
continues to recruit and train, and is heavily reliant on support from Pakistani and 
Afghani Taliban groups.
6
  Despite losses in leadership, Al Qaeda central remains intent 
and capable of striking the US.
7
 The central group consists of a professional cadre of 
terrorist operatives which are utilized by Al Qaeda‘s central leadership both to conduct 
high scale attacks, as well as to enlist the support of local groups. They will either expand 
the organization altogether (by establishing new regional offshoots), or get local support 
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for an upcoming attack. For an upcoming attack, locals will play a strictly supportive 
role, while the main planning and execution of the operation will be conducted by the 
professional Al Qaeda members from the central group.
8
  
Al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates 
 Al Qaeda‘s affiliates and associates are groups or movements that maintain 
limited ideological or direct connection with the Al Qaeda organization. Some groups can 
be co-opted into the Al Qaeda franchise, while others may receive limited support 
without merging into the Al Qaeda organization. 
Al Qaeda‘s affiliates include non-directly affiliated (often Sunni) groups.  They 
include the South East Asian radical Islamic group Jemaah Islamiya, the Somali radical 
group Al Shabaab, Pakistan‘s Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other Muslim insurgent groups 
everywhere from the Russian Caucasus, to Central Europe, to North Africa.
9
 Although 
these groups focus on more regional political objectives, they nonetheless share much of 
the same anti-Western sentiment as Al Qaeda. Many of these groups receive funding, 
training, ideological support, and weapons from Al Qaeda central‘s operatives. These 
groups frequently cooperate with Al Qaeda in carrying out attacks on US embassies and 
military facilities abroad, provided doing so allows them to achieve their own regional 
objectives.
10
 Many of these insurgent groups utilize identical tactics as Al Qaeda and 
follow similar ideologies, although Al Qaeda itself does not directly control jihadist 
movements in each region or country. Al Qaeda‘s main goal is to sponsor isolated 
regional insurgent groups, and have them eventually buy into the Al Qaeda franchise, or 
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at the very least to channel isolated grievances into a ―global jihad‖ with global 
ambitions.
11
 
As a business model, this is equivalent to a local company ―buying into‖ the 
larger Al Qaeda franchise. Al Qaeda, as a large business, conducts a survey of these local 
affiliates to determine whether or not they would be valuable additions to the 
organization. This includes identifying whether compatible ideologies and objectives 
exist, and whether or not the group will provide needed assets to the global Al Qaeda 
network. Al-Shabab is an example. While the group maintains its own leadership and 
local objectives, some believe that it has been co-opted from a local group that received 
training, funds, and arms from Al Qaeda, into a regional affiliate, although this has not 
been conclusively established.
12
 Like many other regional groups wishing to carry the Al 
Qaeda black banner, it needed to make overtures that included a reaffirmation of its 
jihadist ideological commitment. Recruitment from a local movement into the Al Qaeda 
franchise is often a slow integration process that occurs over many years. Al-Shabab‘s 
large Somali diaspora throughout the west is also a potentially valuable operational asset 
that Al Qaeda can leverage. The Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas, however, has 
shown dedication only to its own local anti-Israeli objectives and for this reason has not 
been co-opted by Al Qaeda.
13
  
Some affiliated groups may benefit solely from Al Qaeda‘s financial and materiel 
support without actually adhering to the same ideological views as Al Qaeda. Bosnia is 
an example. Muslim insurgent forces in Bosnia benefited from Afghanistan based Al 
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Qaeda central‘s support (the only real source of support for the group) without taking on 
Al Qaeda‘s global objectives. All other factors equal, ideology is central in determining 
which groups are more likely to be eventually co-opted from a simple affiliate to an 
eventual local branch of the Al Qaeda organization itself. These regional brands are often 
seen publicly as direct offshoots of Al Qaeda (especially after attacks), when in reality 
they may only be receiving limited support from Al Qaeda central.  
Al Qaeda Regional Branches 
 Al Qaeda‘s regional branches are those that have direct connection, either 
ideological or literal, to Al Qaeda central and possibly other regional branches or 
affiliates. According to David Kilcullen, these groups, which maintain considerable 
operational autonomy, are aimed at creating unrest by co-opting local insurgent 
movements. Common ideology and culture play key roles in facilitating this cooperation. 
These groups essentially function as sub hubs within the broader Al Qaeda organization, 
allowing them to maintain and build their own connections. 
Al Qaeda‘s local branches are those that have a direct physical connection to Al 
Qaeda. These include Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and others. These local branches 
have successfully co-opted local insurgencies (many of which are fundamentally Islamic) 
into groups that receive direct operational and ideological guidance from Al Qaeda 
central. This is aimed at aggregating local conflicts across more than 60 countries into 
one unified movement (of which Al Qaeda is the vanguard).
14
 Given the more recent 
diffusion of the Al Qaeda network and disruption of Al Qaeda central‘s command and 
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control capabilities, these local/regional groups are operating more and more 
autonomously, with little if no direction from Al Qaeda central.
15
 Radical Islamic 
movements, such as insurgencies in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia, tend to function 
through ―regional theaters of operation‖, in which radicals can cooperate and conduct 
activities in neighboring countries.
16
 This is to say that Al Qaeda tends to piggyback on 
pre-existing insurgencies by providing tactical support to achieve its broader objectives.  
AQI operations, as evidenced by correspondence from the late AQI leader Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, have been aimed at undermining a democratic government by 
exploiting sectarian divides, as well as utilizing bombings, assassinations of prominent 
Iraqi leaders, and kidnappings, in order to undermine the government. Once this occurs, 
AQI hopes that the collapse of a US sponsored Iraqi regime will cultivate a 
fundamentalist Islamic state in its place. From there, AQI hopes that its radical Islamic 
message will spread to neighboring countries.
17
 
18
 Influenced by Al Qaeda‘s ideology, 
foreign fighters from surrounding countries have flocked to join the cause, giving AQI a 
multinational and multiethnic dimension. As in Iraq, Afghanistan‘s porous borders have 
allowed countless foreign fighters from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the greater Central 
Asia to join the fight in the hopes of waging jihad against the west. As Al Qaeda‘s central 
leadership dissipates, these affiliate groups are poised to ‗assume command‘.  
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While insurgency is not the only pre-condition for the successful establishment of 
a local Al Qaeda group, there is a nearly 85 percent correlation between Islamist 
insurgency and an Al Qaeda presence.
19
 Al Qaeda offers local insurgent movements 
access to funds, recruits, and publicity, all in return for ideological and operational 
support.
20
 Furthermore, although these groups plan and execute their own operations, 
they also independently recruit (as is the case in Yemen), and cooperate between regions. 
Common ideologies, languages, cultures, faiths, and interconnected familial relations by 
birth or marriage, all have served to connect regional jihadist groups. In fact, the 
connections between these radical Islamic groups give the global jihadist movement (Al 
Qaeda as the vanguard), an intricate web of dependency and mutual patronage, more akin 
to the structure of a tribal group and organized crime syndicate than a military 
organization.
21
 With these co-opted or aggregated local insurgencies, Al Qaeda 
essentially operates a large scale insurgency campaign against its enemies utilizing 
asymmetric warfare.  
Establishing Regional Groups 
 As David Kilcullen notes, Al Qaeda‘s methods for establishing regional branches, 
aside from co-opting affiliated movements, include infiltrating members from the central 
group into local communities to establish an integrated presence. Next, Al Qaeda moves 
to aggregate the effects of local insurgent movements by maintaining both ideological 
and (to a lesser extent) direct communication with other regional branches. This in turn 
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prompts a foreign intervention on which Al Qaeda capitalizes as it portrays itself as 
protector of the Muslim population. 
 It is most important to note how Al Qaeda expands its network to incorporate 
new regional groups by further study. Though we have touched on the process of co-
opting affiliated movements, it is necessary to illustrate this process in more detail. Al 
Qaeda‘s general strategy has been to infiltrate members of its central group (mostly 
trainers) into a given country or region, while slowly making themselves more valuable 
to the local insurgency in terms of logistical, financial, or training aid given. This 
includes the establishing of local cells, human intelligence networks, alliances with local 
tribal and community leaders, and sometimes a pact with the regime of the given country 
(as in the Taliban Afghanistan). The Al Qaeda cells can also establish their own training 
camps or indoctrination centers, transportation systems, illicit economies, weapons 
supplies, and media facilities (such as propaganda).
22
  
One technique for developing local alliances that has been employed in numerous 
areas, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, and Yemen, is that Al Qaeda members 
will marry into the local communities, thereby establishing blood relations with key tribal 
members and leaders. This makes it nearly impossible to separate local insurgents from 
hard core members of Al Qaeda central or its subordinate groups. In Iraq, for example, 
Sheiks have sided with Al Qaeda after the Sheik‘s daughters marry an operative of the 
organization.
23
 In this way, Al Qaeda members are not the foreign fighters. As in 
Pakistan, over the past 25 years Al Qaeda has developed highly organic connections with 
local social circles, including everything from establishing close inter tribal connections 
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(largely via marriage), to creating local businesses. Al Qaeda members thus become 
identical to other locals.
24
 In areas with internal conflict, Al Qaeda members often wish to 
continue the struggle, even after local insurgents have declared a truce with other 
factions. This often leads to the eventual alienation of Al Qaeda components in those 
areas.
25
 In the initial penetration phase, members of the local community are initially 
opposed to the new foreign presence, which often displaces the power of local leaders. 
Furthermore, moderate religious leaders are often resistant to Al Qaeda‘s highly 
conservative ideology. Local Al Qaeda cells may then resort to intimidation, forced 
marriage, or directed killings when all else fails. 
After establishing an integrated local presence, the Al Qaeda cell will look toward 
spreading its influence abroad (moving local jihadist movements globally), often through 
a coordinated media and propaganda campaign. This includes operating websites, and 
online newsletters (such as the Al Qaeda managed magazine Inspire , in Yemen, Sawt al-
Jihad, and even a women‘s jihadist magazine called al-Khansa), The intent is to spread 
ideological influence, recruit foreigners (be they Americans, Europeans, or individuals 
from the Middle East) or intimidate enemies. They also seek to portray a larger 
oppression of Muslims worldwide, exploiting disenchantment with many of the social 
and economic challenges mentioned in the previous chapter.
26
 
27
 
As a result of operations conducted by Al Qaeda abroad, or the continued 
destabilization of the local government, foreign intervention may result. This in turn 
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causes what David Kilcullen calls the ―accidental guerilla syndrome‖, a local backlash 
against those that intervene from individuals that are often not at all associated with Al 
Qaeda or the local insurgency. According to Kilcullen, the definition of ―foreigner‖ is 
truly elastic and is highly dependent on local perceptions. Al Qaeda may only be 
considered the foreign group by locals in Pakistan until U.S. or allied forces invade that 
village.
28
  This same sort of dynamic has played out in numerous other conflicts, 
including Chechnya, Bosnia, and Yemen, where insurgents can quickly portray 
themselves as protectors of the local population after a violent intervention. Locals, either 
out of anger or sheer boredom, may choose to join the ranks of the insurgency and 
eventually Al Qaeda. In countries like Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, this 
dynamic exploits basic tribal tendencies where locals will almost always side with the 
closer rather than distant relative, even if the local may not share exactly the same 
ideological view of the insurgent group.
29
 In this sense, Al Qaeda‘s networking structure 
is not some sort of new prototype for guerilla warfare. In fact, its focus on tribal linkages 
looks backward in time more than it looks forwards.
30
  
Weaknesses of Regional Groups and Affiliates 
The apparent weakness of Al Qaeda‘s organizational structure is that by granting 
operational autonomy to its regional branches, it may undermine Al Qaeda‘s binding 
ideological base or alienate the local movements. Al Qaeda‘s efforts to co-opt local 
insurgencies in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq are key examples of this. As will be 
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discussed in chapter three, Al Qaeda has applied these lessons to establish a more organic 
connection with local populations, particularly in Yemen. 
While expanding Al Qaeda‘s franchise offers the organization additional 
resources and new bases for operations, as Bruce Riedel notes, Al Qaeda central lacks 
tight control over its local branches, allowing strategic mistakes. Loose internodal 
connections permit flexibility, but they also allow individual nodes to run operations 
independently from central control.  Local forces (especially those in dire need) will not 
turn down Al Qaeda‘s help and may even surrender limited operational control to them.31 
Ultimately, compatibility across ideology and mission objectives between locals and Al 
Qaeda seem to be the determining factor in whether or not Al Qaeda will establish a 
lasting presence in a given area.  
During the Bosnian War in 1992 for example, Arab foreign fighters travelled to 
Bosnia to assist the local soldiers in fighting off the armed Serbian invasion. Members of 
the fanatical Islamic Holy Warrior Brigade, or Kaatebat al Mujahideen, became a fully 
integrated part of the Bosnia 7
th
 Army.  They were known for using, Afghan style guerilla 
warfare, and mass suicide assaults against Bosnian paramilitaries, and eventually UN and 
Croatian allies. In addition to tactical disagreement between local Bosnian forces and 
Mujahadeen fighters, Bosnian leadership was resentful of the prospect of their land 
becoming a staging area for the global jihadist movement.In combination with the peace 
accords this ultimately led to the Mujahadeen‘s expulsion.32 Similarly, Chechnya‘s 
secular leadership, which has reluctantly accepted Arab foreign fighter support, has 
consistently been at odds with their highly conservative jihadist ideology. Though both 
                                                          
31
 Reid Sawyer, telephone interview by author, October 25, 2010. 
32
 Michael Innes, ed. Denial of Sanctuary (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 55. 
39 
 
the secular Chechen government and the jihadists eventually waged full scale war against 
each other, this was put to an end by Russia‘s invasion of Chechnya, which 
unintentionally forced both jihadists and seculars back into a tense alliance.
33
 Though in 
both of these instances supporting environmental factors existed that supported the 
presence of Al Qaeda, the mission and ideology became the prohibiting factors. 
A similar dynamic occurred with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), under the leadership of 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Following the US invasion of Iraq, AQI sought (and still seeks) 
to exploit sectarian cleavages in Iraq to spur civil war. This was to be achieved by 
targeting Iraqi Shia militant groups and the Shia dominated government via roadside 
bombings, the bombing of Shia mosques, and targeted killings of leaders.  The hope was 
to instigate Shia retaliation against Iraqi Sunnis. Zarqawi hoped this would draw in 
outside Sunni support from neighboring countries, resulting in a violent cycle of civil 
sectarian conflict that would eventually topple the Iraqi government.
34
 While AQI allied 
itself with local Sunni tribes, it did not rely heavily on their support to carry out 
operations, largely as a result of Zarqawi‘s distrust of the local mujahedeen and 
disinterest in maintaining good rapport with the Sunni tribes. Furthermore, AQI 
operations only focused on Al Qaeda‘s global objectives without incorporating those of 
local tribes. At the same time, AQI undertook heavy handed tactics to integrate into the 
local community including forced tribal marriages and killings of tribal elders, all the 
while imposing its highly conservative ideology upon more secular citizens. In effect, 
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AQI‘s actions turned many tribes against it (Sunni and Shia alike), leaving AQI little 
operational room in Iraq.
35
   
Al Qaeda is a learning organization. Many of these lessons are being applied to 
other regional enclaves, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
Although this will be discussed in depth in the next chapter, AQAP has sought to 
establish close relations with Yemeni tribes, integrating local objectives and grievances 
more significantly into AQAP operations.
36
 The limitations discussed here have major 
implications for how (or if) Al Qaeda will be able to expand its reach to other countries. 
There is a clear tradeoff that can be seen: while heavily integrating into the local 
community provides sanctuary, it forces Al Qaeda to remain more local.  As its local 
branches turn more toward a pursuit of Al Qaeda‘s global objectives (such as targeting 
the US), it risks alienating itself from the local populace.  
Al Qaeda Network 
 Beyond Al Qaeda‘s more or less organized structure, the Al Qaeda network, 
according to Bruce Hoffman, consists of homegrown Islamic radicals from across the 
globe that may not have a direct connection with Al Qaeda but have more of an 
inspirational relationship with the organization (usually via internet recruitment or 
exposure to radical propaganda). These individuals may carry out attacks independently 
or with the support of Al Qaeda and its regional affiliates. The Al Qaeda network 
comprises like minded individuals that share a collective sense of grievance towards the 
West, and belief in Al Qaeda‘s highly conservative ideology.  
                                                          
35
 Ibid 
36
 Borzou Daragahi, "Yemen Branch of Al Qaeda Avoids Mistakes Made in Iraq, Report Says," Los 
Angeles Times, November 4, 2010. 
41 
 
The Al Qaeda network encompasses a diverse set of individual backgrounds. 
Although many of these individuals are marginalized, may live in lower socioeconomic 
classes, and practice conservative Islam, still others come from upper class families, are 
well educated, and practice liberal Islam.
37
 Mujahadeen fighters with years of experience 
in fighting guerilla warfare in the mountains of Afghanistan are obviously not well suited 
to carry out operations in urban London or New York. This is illustrative of why Al 
Qaeda needs and seeks native recruits.
38
 Again, the common factor that links these 
recruits is commitment to ideology and mission.
39
 For this reason, the internet, as will be 
discussed later, is the primary method of maintaining this grassroots network of 
‗secondary‘ followers. Some of these individuals may also travel abroad to receive 
training (such as Yemen or Pakistan), or may carry out their own operations with the 
mere inspirational guidance of Al Qaeda.  
Al Qaeda’s Finance Network 
Al Qaeda has also managed to maintain a far reaching financial base, in part as a 
result of its ties with Sunni fundamentalist groups. Strict adherence to Islamic codes 
forbid Al Qaeda operatives from using interest charging banks, forcing them instead to 
rely conveniently on a wide range of alternative institutions, including charities, NGOs, 
and unwitting donors. Money is often passed person to person with no intermediary 
banks or electronic wire transfers, making Al Qaeda‘s financial resources extremely 
difficult to track.
40
 Islamic banks throughout the Middle East, including the oil rich 
                                                          
37
 Bruce Hoffman, "The Global Terrorist Threat: Is Al Qaeda on the Run or on the March?" p. 48. 
38
 Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy," 
39
 Bruce Hoffman, "The Global Terrorist Threat: Is Al Qaeda on the Run or on the March?" p. 48. 
40
 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International 
Security 27, no. 3: p. 50, (accessed May 1, 2010). 
42 
 
countries of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, hold substantial portions of Al Qaeda‘s funds. 
While these countries have actively cooperated with US authorities to track down Al 
Qaeda‘s money transfers, domestic sensitivities and inadequate domestic law 
enforcement in those countries often impede the financial intelligence gathering.
41
 
Al Qaeda’s Mission and Strategy   
Al Qaeda‘s global mission follows closely from its highly conservative views. 
Among Al Qaeda‘s core aspirations are the expulsion of the US military from the Middle 
East, as well as the establishment of an Islamic caliphate that stretches across the Middle 
East, Africa, Asia, and Europe.
42
 Simultaneously, Al Qaeda wages war on the West both 
operationally (via terrorist attacks) and economically as well. Although Al Qaeda is a 
terrorist organization, terrorism simply represents the most effective tactic available to 
the organization (and as is typical in insurgent warfare). 
After declaring war on the West in 1998, Ayman al Zawahiri laid out a two step 
strategy for achieving the aforementioned goals (which in reality are pursued 
simultaneously). The first stage of this strategy is to create chaos in the Middle East, as 
well as the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Egypt, the fallout of which would 
force the US from the region. Therefore, ‗creating chaos‘ has frequently entailed 
piggybacking on existing insurgencies by supplying weapons, materiel, training and 
ideological support to aid in the destabilization and overthrow of governments. It is 
important to note that with the exception of a couple of cases, Al Qaeda has co-opted 
local insurgent movements without directly controlling them. Al Qaeda‘s objective is to 
aggregate the effects of a number of disparate conflicts, and to incite the world‘s Muslim 
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population into overthrowing the world‘s ‗corrupt‘ regimes (in a manner consistent with 
insurgent movements rather than traditional terrorist groups).
43
   
The second stage is to use the caliphate as a base of operations from which the 
Islamic world can wage jihad against the West. These radical political objectives 
distinguish Al Qaeda from state or regional terrorist groups with more conservative (and 
achievable) political objectives.
44
 This is important to note because it has implications for 
how much support Al Qaeda can achieve when integrating with local communities or 
insurgent groups that will likely have much more limited political objectives.  
In the second stage, Al Qaeda‘s military strategy is two dimensional with 
economic and operational sides. It is aimed at forcing the West to intervene in local 
conflicts (even a small terrorist attack could provoke a large scale intervention), and 
becoming engaged for a prolonged period of time, expending vast amounts of blood, 
treasure, and political will in the process. Their goals are particularly successful if the 
initial situation is not improved.  While the foreign intervener is engaged in the given 
region, Al Qaeda relies on classic insurgent tactics of provoking the enemy‘s 
overreaction, exploiting the fallout of that overreaction to co-opt the local populace, and 
killing locals that cooperate with the enemy.
45
 However, using violence to co-opt the 
local population also has repercussions.  
Economically, Al Qaeda hopes that by forcing the US and the West to engage in 
prolonged conflict it will overload the Western military, police, and intelligence services 
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with astronomic spending on security, and putting strains on their respective economies.
46
 
A coordinated propaganda campaign also encourages grassroots jihadism throughout the 
West. By using the ―swarm‖ tactic of attacking from multiple nodes or planting the 
‗black banner‘ in a foreign country, Al Qaeda  aims at overloading Western national 
security services.
47
 In this regard, lone wolf, homegrown attackers can be just as effective 
as hardcore Al Qaeda members given the media‘s attention to failed attacks.48 
Al Qaeda’s Ideology 
Given the loose connections of the Al Qaeda network, ideology is central to 
maintaining both organizational stability and operational effectiveness across dispersed 
nodes within the full matrix Al Qaeda organization. Al Qaeda‘s ideology is rooted in a 
highly conservative Salfi Islamist sect, whose theological goal is human and Islamic 
reform. Al Qaeda sees itself as the vanguard of this global reform, and consistently 
justifies its actions through this lens. It is important to keep in mind that ideology also 
plays a critical role in Al Qaeda‘s ability to expand its network, penetrate states or 
regions, and recruit within the global jihadist network. As mentioned earlier, ideology is 
an essential determinate of which groups are more likely to be co-opted into the Al Qaeda 
organization, and which individuals (at the grassroots level) are susceptible to 
recruitment.  
 Although Al Qaeda‘s senior leadership practices variants of Islam, Al Qaeda is 
primarily rooted in Salafism, an extremely conservative religious tradition that is an 
offshoot of Sunni Islam, one of two primary sects of modern Islam. Salafists argue that 
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contemporary Islam has strayed from its fundamental roots, and that contemporary 
believers should turn their focus toward an old, ―pure‖ Islam rooted in the teachings of 
the prophet Mohammed and the Koran.  Both of which are considered the highest sources 
of moral reasoning and social conduct.
49
 Extreme Salafists, known as Salafi Jihadists, 
believe that in order to protect this fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, Muslims 
should strive to reestablish the political structures of the 7
th
 century Muslim caliphate and 
reinstitute Sharia law (a strict religious moral code). As such, bin Laden viewed Taliban 
Afghanistan under Sharia law as an example for all Muslim countries to aspire to.
50
 The 
establishment of such a state is to be achieved through ―jihad‖, meaning holy war. 
This notion of jihad was pioneered by Said Qutb, an Islamic writer and teacher of 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, currently Al Qaeda‘s second in command. Qutb‘s theological 
concept focuses on the notion of reforming, through jihad, Islam and human society. 
Qutb argues that the latter has strayed from the fundamental teachings of Islam which 
prescribes a universal society governed by Islamic law. As Qutb argues, the world today 
is plagued by jahiliyyah, or a state of ignorance and corruption in which men reject divine 
authority for human authority, both in the context of the secular , religious,  political and 
social environment. This prevents individuals from having a direct relationship with God, 
and therefore living according to divine law. Jahiliyyah is a social and spiritual condition 
of society, and is not bound to a particular state or region. In this state of Jahiliyyah, 
individuals follow and are blinded by their own personal ambitions and lust. While 
people are able to recite and learn the words of the Koran, they lack a practical 
understanding of the first generation of ‗pure‘ Muslims, and how to live by their laws. It 
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is therefore necessary to return the world to the pure system of Islamic governance of the 
period of Mohammad. Jahiliyyah prevents individuals from reforming their ideas so that 
they will serve only God, which is the necessary duty of all men. According to Qutb, all 
societies are either Jahiliyyah or Muslim.
51
 
To bring about reform, a vanguard of true followers is needed to lead the world, 
through jihad out of Jahiliyyah and into true freedom under Sharia law. Upon Qutb‘s 
death, Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden‘s mentor, conceived of Al Qaeda as a means of 
achieving this type of reform. Jihad can be waged with force in defense of Islam, and 
offensively through any means that directly supports God‘s will. According to Qutb, 
jihad has ―no relationship to modern warfare‖ either in its causes or in how it is 
conducted. It is jihad bis saif (striving through fighting) which aims to clear the way for a 
unified land in which there is an organic connection between religion and politics under 
Sharia law. This is essentially the return to a fundamental relationship between man and 
God with the complete abolition of social, ethnic, and political classes.
52
 It is important to 
note that jihad is not a defensive or offensive movement in the conventional sense, but 
rather a movement for the defense of Islam against corrupting forces, and those which 
limit man‘s freedom.53 In this way, Al Qaeda‘s ideology and concept of a caliphate is 
really to protect the Muslim community and save all men by bringing them to serve God. 
As such, Al Qaeda sees itself as the vanguard of the global jihadist movement, the 
protector of the ummah (the world‘s Muslim population) and leader of a number of 
disparate jihadist insurgencies around the world. 
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More recently bin Laden has extrapolated on this, saying that Al Qaeda‘s 
operations are justified, just as any person has the right to defend themselves from attack: 
―this is a legal right…this is reassurance that we are fighting for the sake of God.‖54 By 
Qutb‘s definition, Islam is a way of life and a religion (not simply a belief), and in this 
sense is true freedom. Though jihad may be waged in the immediate sense against states 
or regions, its ultimate goal is a universal system under Sharia law. Contrary to western 
perception, Qutb argues, jihad is not a fanatical holy war. Rather, it is the West that has 
been engaged in an ―unholy war‖ by exploiting foreign markets, political systems, and 
the East‘s wealth of natural resources.55 The jihadist struggle, Qutb notes, will continue 
until divine law is the only law which governs the lives of men.  
It is no surprise that jihadist ideology resonates with potential followers at a very 
personal level. Although Al Qaeda may be comprised of religious fanatics, their ideology 
is based upon moralistic and relatively moderate principles.
56
 For young populations, the 
global jihadist movement is a long indoctrination process that goes beyond brainwashing. 
It takes place over the span of one's young adult life where certain verses of the Koran are 
read and interpreted in such a way that the belief in jihad and its fundamental principles 
makes theological sense, and speaks to that person directly.
57
 Without this connection, 
many experts have acknowledged that Al Qaeda would lose relevance amongst the global 
Muslim community, and could not survive as an organization.  
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This ideology is the central component to what many call the ‗global jihadist 
network‘. Using the term network can be misleading however, as the ‗connection‘ 
between disparate jihadist movements may only be a shared ideology rather than 
intentional operational coordination. Nonetheless, common ideology is a remarkably 
effective ‗networking‘ tool that encourages jihadist movements to coordinate with one 
another, and one which Al Qaeda actively uses to establish its own presence.  As in the 
business model, if Al Qaeda wants to ‗buy into‘ a particular area, it will be more 
successful in doing so if there is an existing pool of individuals that share a similar 
ideology. 
Weaknesses of Al Qaeda’s Ideological Pillars 
Since the early 1900s, many radical Salafi jihadists have adopted what is known 
as ―takfir methodology‖, namely the ability to partake in what would normally be 
considered violations of the Koran (killing of civilians, drinking alcohol, prostitution, 
shaving beards) in order to deceive the enemy in the course of waging jihad.
58
 While 
intended to maximize operational efficiency by allowing deviations from Al Qaeda‘s 
highly conservative norms, it has impacted upon both the organization‘s operational 
effectiveness and popularity throughout the Muslim world. 
Al Qaeda has now adopted the takfir method as an integral part of how it conducts 
its operations abroad, although in many cases this has served to undermine the premise of 
Al Qaeda as being a protector of the Muslim people. While takfir gives Al Qaeda wiggle 
room through which it can conduct operations, some suggest that this radical 
methodology creates distrust between members of the organization. For example, because 
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takfir prescribes the rooting out of ―non-believers‖ and since members within the Al 
Qaeda network have different views as to who or what is ―religiously pure‖, this can 
confuse and distort the decision making at the operational or tactical levels.
59
 
Despite the concept of takfir, Al Qaeda‘s continued killing of innocent Muslims 
represents a significant challenge to Al Qaeda‘s role as the vanguard of jihad. While bin 
Laden has made various attempts at recasting this violence in light of the US‘ continued 
attacks on Muslim civilians (corruption etc.), Al Qaeda is nonetheless losing popularity 
amongst the global Muslim community. According to the 2010 US Intelligence 
Community‘s Annual Threat Assessment, two thirds of Muslims have said that extremists 
attacks on civilians ―cannot be justified at all‖, and overall support for Al Qaeda 
continues to be a minority view.
60
 According to World Public Opinion, however, roughly 
half of Muslims in lower income countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Indonesia, and 
Pakistan expressed agreement with Al Qaeda‘s ideology. No more than 23 percent of 
those individuals supported Al Qaeda‘s use of suicide attacks.61 Throughout Europe, 
support for radical Islamist movements is very low with more Islamic activist groups 
moving to support political and economic reform rather than resort to violent 
radicalism.
62
 Because jihadism is not theologically accurate, it is not likely to appeal to 
those who are knowledgeable in Islamic theology. This has major implications for the 
future of Al Qaeda‘s ideology (or its network) and its ability to continue to expand. 
The Role of the Internet and Global Media 
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Al Qaeda‘s exploitation of the internet serves as the organization‘s primary means 
of recruitment, maintaining relevance, and communicating both within regional 
franchises and the broader grassroots Al Qaeda network. It also serves as a vital 
operational tool by amplifying the publicity effects of isolated terrorist attacks. 
In terms of recruitment and communication, utilization of the internet has 
included everything from the distribution of jihadist audio cassettes and videos at the 
local level (used in regional franchises), and the global proliferation of online books and 
monographs (both in English and Arabic) written by respected jihadist scholars, and to 
targeting grassroots followers in the West.
63
 In this way, Al Qaeda is able to establish an 
organic rapport with individuals rather than the cliché like mindless brainwashing of 
disenfranchised youth.  Given the level of proliferation of jihadist propaganda, it may be 
virtually impossible to distinguish an Al Qaeda operative from a member of the broader 
jihadist social network. With easy access and lack of regulation, Al Qaeda now has 
virtually unimpeded reach throughout the world.  
Many experts have called the internet a virtual online ―terrorism university‖, 
where jihadists can meet, coordinate, and broaden their vision of Islam.
64
 As Social 
Networking Analysis illustrates, communication is essential in diffuse, dynamic, 
multinodal networks. For this reason, the grassroots Al Qaeda network is by its nature, 
entirely dependent upon its ability to maintain communication between regional groups 
and members of the network. The communication between Al Qaeda central and its 
regional groups is almost entirely spiritual or strategic (as claimed in Al Qaeda‘s 
propaganda) rather than direct. 
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 Al Qaeda‘s use of the internet and media outlets as an operational tool has 
transformed many local events or terrorist attacks into what are known as ―glocal‖ 
events.
65
 For instance, with access to a digital camera and an internet connection, the 
accidental killing of civilians in Afghanistan by coalition forces can quickly be publicized 
by Al Qaeda as a direct attack on Muslims. Al Qaeda‘s regional franchises can encourage 
locals to rise up against their respective governments, eliminating the need for direct 
contact with Al Qaeda central. Given the media‘s attention to small scale attacks and 
even failed attacks, such as the failed Christmas Day bombing attempt, Al Qaeda can 
produce the same saturation effect on Western security services that successful attacks 
provide. As social psychologists note, crises such as terrorist attacks tend to lead to more 
simplistic and less rational thinking.  This leads to individuals, particularly military and 
political leaders, making snap, seat-of-the-pants decisions.  Again, central to Al Qaeda‘s 
strategy is capitalizing on states‘ overreactions to terrorist attacks in the hope that they 
will further compromise their own security. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined Al Qaeda‘s diffuse organizational structure, its 
mission and ideological pillars, and exploitation of the global media, particularly the 
internet. In light of Al Qaeda‘s structure, it can be seen how ideology, shared mission, 
and constant (albeit indirect) communication play key roles in maintaining structural and 
operational cohesiveness across the organization. Practically, Al Qaeda can be considered 
a full matrix network.   
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In the chapters that follow, this analysis will help to illustrate the nature of Al 
Qaeda‘s presence in Yemen and the United Kingdom, some of the organization‘s current 
structural and operational limitations, and as well the ability to predict the outcome of the 
organization‘s attempts at developing network bases.  
53 
 
Chapter 3: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a highly structured and 
increasingly well organized regional group within the broader Al Qaeda organization. 
AQAP combines hub-like command and control structures with the decentralized 
stability of a full matrix network, and receives strategic guidance from Al Qaeda central. 
Learning from its operational mistakes in Iraq, Al Qaeda has proven successful in 
developing a well integrated local presence in Yemen by exploiting the country‘s 
favorable environmental conditions, and particularly its tribes. It earned international 
attention with its 2009 Christmas Day trans-Atlantic airline bombing attempt, proving its 
nascent ability to launch global operations. Through its targeted propaganda campaign, 
AQAP has also proven capable of developing its own international network of 
ideological followers including Westerners. For all its success at establishing an 
integrated local presence, AQAP‘s long term, Al Qaeda inspired strategic objectives puts 
it at risk of alienating local partners. However it will likely still maintain the ability to 
launch global operations.  After presenting the various environmental conditions that 
have made Yemen a safe haven for AQAP, this chapter will look at the organization‘s 
structure, and means of exploiting these environmental factors. 
Understanding Yemen’s Complex Political, Social and Religious Environment 
 Yemen‘s underlying social, demographic, and security conditions have created a 
favorable environment for Al Qaeda to exploit as it attempts to establish an integrated 
presence in the country and conduct operations. Specifically, the nature of Yemen‘s tribal 
communities, particularly their social relations and cultural norms, gives Al Qaeda 
venues through which it can achieve a great deal of protection and sanctuary. Yemen‘s 
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highly decentralized and unstable government has allotted considerable autonomy to the 
country‘s tribes even while its central government policies continue to fuel instability. In 
addition to its historically conservative Islamic sects, Yemen is also home to an extensive 
and experienced network of jihadists. The country also faces a significant economic and 
demographic crisis. In addition to these factors, Yemen faces two major rebel movements 
in the North and South, the fallout of which provide Al Qaeda with further physical and 
ideological support. 
Yemen’s Tribes  
 Within Yemen, tribes are the central pillars of governance and society. Tribe sizes 
vary from a cluster of extended families from as few as 50 people, to as many as 1,000. 
In Arabic, ―tribe‖ is interpreted flexibly and can refer to friendly reception or hospitality, 
rather than the tight connection of a family tie. Therefore the size and nature of a tribe is 
often dependent on perspective and circumstance.
1
 Each tribe consists of families and 
clans that are connected either by blood or by shared alliances or customs. For centuries, 
tribes in Yemen have effectively acted as microstates, each with its own leadership, 
authority structures, and administrative divisions. Yemen‘s tribes have a long history and 
culture of independence and self governance, and over the course of thousands of years 
have essentially developed what are semi-autonomous states. These structures govern the 
tribe from the smallest unit of an individual village, to the large number of villages within 
the tribe. Although these tribes have developed different governance and leadership 
structures, there are a number of similarities that span them. These include the umana, a 
leader who oversees individual villages; the elders, who administer clans in nearby 
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villages; and the Sheik, essentially the pinnacle of tribal leadership who directs the entire 
tribe. 
2
 Tribal leadership is relatively pyramidal, though the Sheik‘s power and position 
are highly dependent upon the consent and goodwill of the elders (who themselves are 
dependent upon the approval of the tribesmen).
3
 In this way, cultural norms of honor 
continue to facilitate relations between tribesmen, and damaging one‘s honor is 
equivalent to social condemnation.
4
  This makes it considerably difficult for an individual 
tribesman to expel, or turn over outsiders to government authorities as doing so reflects 
negatively upon the entire tribe.  
Governance in Yemen, exercised primarily through the tribes, is a network of 
complex social and cultural norms and legal structures that define everyday life.
5
  In 
Yemeni tribal law, norms of acceptance and protection of outsiders continues to be a 
hallmark, where obligatory protection is provided to a vaguely defined range of foreign 
travelers, political refugees, or those unable to physically protect themselves. Tribal laws 
govern both inter and intra-tribal affairs, are based upon a long history of shared tradition 
and history, and are highly adaptive and efficient and often preferred by many tribesman 
over strict Islamic (Sharia) law.
6
 Even so, Sharia law is followed in parallel to tribal laws 
and governs issues including theft, violence, and penalties for crimes. Unlike hardcore 
Salafists however, Yemenis interpret Sharia as more of a general framework for 
individuals, and where it lacks guidance on specific day to day issues (such as the 
resolution of conflicts), tribal law is referenced. In this way, conservative Islamic 
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practices continue to permeate everyday thinking and daily life where applicable.
7
 
Though Al Qaeda‘s ideology is a far cry from that of many tribes, shared religion offers 
AQAP a level of compatibility through which the organization can appeal to, or maintain 
a lasting presence in Yemen‘s tribes.  
Lack of Central Governance 
Yemen‘s central government is a highly decentralized network of administrative 
divisions that exercise little control, and provide few social services to a country with a 
rugged geography. The government consists of smaller governates or administrative 
divisions which provide little to no assistance to the local population and have limited 
contact with the capital Sanaa.
8
 Sanaa has sought to deregulate utility services to these 
regional administrative posts, prioritizing government delivery of essential medical 
services and water supplies to urban areas, essentially leaving these rural governates to 
fend for themselves.
9
  
Remote and rugged areas throughout the country are largely inaccessible, and 
successive Yemeni central governments, including that of current Yemeni president Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, have had to carefully balance tribal authority to ensure relative stability 
in these areas. In fact, the Yemeni government actively directs state resources to the 
tribes, including financial handouts, direct access to government institutions, and in some 
cases support from the military.
10
 These payments serve as an incentive for the tribes‘ 
maintenance of physical and social stability, although by supporting what is essentially 
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an ―informal army‖ of tribesmen, it has effectively undermined the government‘s 
monopoly on the use of force.
11
  
Where government payments have succeeded in maintaining relative stability in 
the past, a plummeting economy and scarce food and water resources have impeded the 
Saleh administration‘s ability to continue this patronage system. This has also contributed 
to intertribal tensions (particularly in the South), as well as tensions between once loyal 
tribes and the central government.
12
 Cooperation between the state and the tribes has been 
heavily dependent upon shared norms, customs, and values.
13
 As such, many tribes have 
seen this curtailment of government handouts as a direct assault on the honor of the 
Sheiks.
14
 However, despite the many underlying social and economic problems facing the 
country, the Saleh administration has committed little support to these tribes other than 
what is immediately needed to maintain the regime‘s power.15 Often this has involved 
supplying weapons and financial aid to competing political parties, tribes, or radical 
Islamist factions to ensure a balance of power outside of Sanaa while activating 
intertribal tensions in the process. Because these tribes support illicit economies and 
activities, and a non-state security apparatus, they provide Al Qaeda with access to both 
resources and shelter.  
Beyond the inability of the government to exert control and maintain security 
throughout most of Yemen, many of the government‘s policies are directly contributing 
to the country‘s instability. With unrest in both the North and South of Yemen, the 
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Yemeni government has focused most of its resources and attention on the conflicts that 
represent the most immediate threat to the regime‘s survival, thus making the costly 
mistake of ignoring Al Qaeda.
16
 At the same time, Saleh has used religion to his 
advantage by subsidizing various radical religious institutes in the North (many of which 
likely support Al Qaeda‘s recruitment efforts) while also using his connections with 
radical Sunni groups to arm tribal mercenaries in order to fight the secessionists.
17
 
However, because of the current decline in state revenues (particularly due to a fall in oil 
revenue), the Saleh administration has relied increasingly on punitive airstrikes against 
remote tribal areas as a means of coercion, a stark contrast to previous attempts by the 
government to peacefully work with the tribes.
18
 Compounding Saleh‘s problems is an 
increasingly close military relationship with the US since 9/11, causing many radical 
jihadists previously allied with the central government to turn against it.
19
 In sum, by 
ignoring the underlying social and economic grievances of the Yemeni population, using 
heavy handed (and often imprecise) military assaults on tribes, and endorsing Salafi 
militias to fight insurgents, the government has contributed to the country‘s instability by 
creating socio-political conditions that Al Qaeda can exploit. Yemen‘s lack of 
governance to date, and Yemenis distrust of Sanaa, means that the government‘s efforts 
to exert more authority in tribal areas contribute to its declining popularity. 
Religion and the Presence of Jihadist Networks 
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 Yemenis generally practice some of the more conservative sects of Islam in the 
Middle East. Over the past 40 years, the country has also been home to a number of 
Islamic fundamentalist movements that have developed expansive jihadist networks 
throughout Yemen. During the 1960s and 1970s, radical Islamist groups were a 
cornerstone of Yemeni society. During Yemen‘s communist rule, Northern Yemen 
recruited the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, along with other Islamist 
groups, as proxies to overthrow Southern Yemen‘s communist government. This was 
similar to the dynamic that occurred during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. With 
an influx of weapons and financial support, political and religious leaders in Northern 
Yemen, including Sheik Abdul al-Zindani (a leader of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, 
who allegedly has financial ties to Osama bin Laden) established a number of jihadist 
guerilla units and Tarbiah religious schools that gave militant organizations a steady flow 
of recruits.
20
 Over time, Yemen became a base and hub for jihadists.
21
  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Yemeni government allowed numerous 
Yemeni jihadists to travel abroad to fight in various Muslim conflicts, including Bosnia, 
Chechnya, and Afghanistan. Successive Yemeni governments have co-opted these 
experienced militants to assist in quelling tribal and sectarian unrest. Although Yemen‘s 
current jihadist network is largely homegrown and comprised of inexperienced fighters, it 
is built around a leadership cadre of experienced jihadists who have fought abroad.
22
 
Throughout the 1990s, jihadists continued to enjoy direct connections and support with 
the highest levels of leadership in Yemen‘s government. This eventually ceased in the 
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late 1990s due in large part to disagreement between jihadists and the government over 
the proposed basing of US forces in Yemen.
23
  
In recent years, Salafists and Wahabis have become more vocal in Southern and 
eastern Yemen. The radical Al Iman University in Sanaa, run by al-Zindani, has alumni 
that include John Walker Lindh (American Taliban member) and Farouk Abdulmutallab. 
The university offers degrees in Sharia law, and has been consistently supported by Saleh 
despite US claims that the school serves as a pipeline for fundamentalists.
24
 According to 
Gregory Johnsen, the school continues to attract foreign students from around the world 
(including the US, Europe, and the Middle East). Yemen‘s long history of fostering 
jihadist circles and abundance of conservative Muslims provides AQAP with fertile soil 
on which it can flourish.  
Economic and Demographic Crisis 
 One of Yemen‘s major problems is its enduring economic crisis. Yemen‘s oil 
reserves, which currently generate more than 75 percent of government revenue, are 
projected to run out in the next 10 years.
25
 Again, this has created significant tensions 
throughout the country as the government spends a significant portion of its budget on 
subsidies to citizens, tribes, and government employees. Yemen‘s dependency on its 
limited oil supplies means that potential attacks on its reserves would have crippling 
effects that could accelerate Yemen‘s likely decline into state failure.26  
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 Other significant factors are Yemen‘s rapidly dwindling water supply, burgeoning 
unemployment rate, and large illicit economy. Yemen has the lowest per capita water 
availability in the world and, due to Sanaa‘s poor regulation of water supplies, corruption, 
and reprioritization of water delivery to urban areas, many isolated rural communities 
have been forced to rely on their own fresh water procurement.
27
 For this reason, massive 
food shortages also plague the country, and child malnutrition rates are amongst the 
highest in the world. This has helped to further undermine the government‘s credibility. 
Unemployment in Yemen hovers at 35 to 40 percent, and the country‘s population 
growth rate exceeds three percent per year. Many of Yemen‘s youth are younger than 24, 
and Yemenis currently live on less than 2 dollars per day.
28
 These demographic and 
economic factors have contributed to a marked increase in discontent amongst the 
Yemeni population over the past decade. Yemen is also home to a large illicit economy 
that facilitates international narcotics and weapons trafficking. Qat, a narcotic leaf hugely 
popular in Yemen and Somalia, is both imported from Somalia and grown locally, 
serving as a crucial source of income for many Yemeni farmers.  
Domestic Unrest in Yemen: The Houthi Rebellion and Southern Secession 
 Besides economic and demographic turmoil, Yemen faces two major ongoing 
conflicts: the Houthi rebellion in the North and secessionists in the South. The Houthi 
rebellion, which began during the arrest of former parliament member Husein al-Houthi, 
resulted in a continued struggle under the leadership of his relative. The initial stages of 
the conflict, which eventually flared into open violence in 2004, stemmed from a history 
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of local and tribal violence and has since created a large humanitarian crisis in its wake.
29
 
Unlike the Southern movement, the Houthi rebellion in the North does not seek to 
overthrow the Yemeni government. At its base, it is a conflict over local material 
discontent, competing identities, perceived socioeconomic injustice, and a desire for 
Northern tribal autonomy.
30 The Houthis, who practice Zaidi Islam (a branch of Shiism), 
also say that they are defending their religion from the Yemeni government, which they 
claim has come under the influence of Salafists. 
Since the unification of Yemen, Southern Yemen has complained of economic 
and social marginalization. The Southern conflict traces back to the 1990 unification of 
the country, and subsequent civil war in 1994, after which many former Southern 
government officials were replaced with Northern ones.
31
 Initially a dispute between 
former bureaucrats, military officers, and the central government over higher pensions, it 
has become an unorganized movement of disgruntled citizens without any coherent 
ideology or clear cut goals. Though the majority of Yemen‘s oil reserves are located in 
the South, the region has seen little development, a fact that the Southerners claim is a 
result of the government siphoning off the country‘s oil revenue.32 Although most of the 
unrest has been political rather than physical, limited only to violent protests and 
destruction of property, secessionist sentiment is rising as government forces use 
increasingly repressive tactics against protestors. According to a retired Southern colonel, 
many Southerners are simply waiting until the government is unable to make patronage 
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payments to the local tribes, after which Southerners will launch a coordinated offensive 
against the state.
33
  
 The net effect of these conflicts has created fertile ground for Al Qaeda to exploit. 
With an expansive and porous border with Saudi Arabia in the North, and the under 
policed Gulf of Aden in the South, large amounts of weapons, explosives, narcotics, and 
people have flooded into these conflicts. Smuggling routes correlate closely with the 
presence of Al Qaeda cells, and tribal leaders (which are supported by the government) 
actively control and protect these routes to reap economic benefits, creating a mutually 
supportive network of terrorists, government officials, and tribal leaders that is nearly 
impossible to untangle.
34
 At an ideological level, the fallout of these conflicts has created 
a large pool of disenfranchised recruits for Al Qaeda to tap into. In addition, US support 
to the Yemeni government (including known airstrikes against Al Qaeda militants) has 
caused much discontent amongst tribal leaders who see this as an invasion. Al Qaeda 
militants can use this support to confirm their narrative of the US invading the Muslim 
lands. 
 As the Yemeni government is preoccupied with its own internal security issues, 
Islamist militants and other disaffected groups are seizing the opportunity to mobilize and 
coordinate operations. It is important to note that as the Huthi conflict reached the high 
water mark in late 2009, so did Al Qaeda‘s operational and propaganda activity.35 
Furthermore, as Yemen struggles with the country‘s two major conflicts, the state‘s lack 
of effective counterterrorism legislation further increases its appeal as a Sunni jihadist 
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safe haven.
36
 Yemen‘s extremely poor prison system is often a major source of 
recruitment, where frequent visits from radical imams and prison breaks aid in Al Qaeda 
recruitment.  
The Al Qaeda Connection 
 AQAP is an increasingly hierarchical and well structured regional group within 
the broader Al Qaeda organization. However, given its proven ability to operate with 
significant independence from Al Qaeda central, according to Gregory Johnsen, AQAP 
essentially functions in parallel to, rather than as a subsidiary of Al Qaeda central.
37
 This 
section looks at AQAP‘s organizational structure; use of propaganda to recruit and 
maintain local relevance; exploitation of and integration into local tribes; and the inherent 
weaknesses of AQAP‘s approach. 
AQAP and its Organizational Structure 
Although Al Qaeda has had a known presence in Yemen since 1992, the group 
officially known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed by a merger 
of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Al Qaeda in Yemen branches in January 2009. Prior to 
this, Al Qaeda in Yemen essentially functioned as a logistical, propaganda, and recruiting 
hub to serve Al Qaeda central in Afghanistan. The two Al Qaeda entities in Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen did have historical linkages.
38
 Following the CIA assassination of Al Qaeda 
in Yemen leader Abu Ali- al-Harithi in 2002, and the subsequent capture of his 
replacement Mohammed Hamdi al –Ahdal, Al Qaeda in Yemen was largely defeated by 
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late 2003.
39
 After the 2006 escape of 23 Al Qaeda suspects from a Yemeni prison, 
including current AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi, the organization made efforts to 
quickly reorganize and rebuild Al Qaeda in Yemen.
40
 Since June 2007 when Al Qaeda 
re-announced its presence in the country and claimed al-Wahayshi as its local 
commander, al-Wahayshi has sought to create an organization with a durable structure 
that can withstand the loss of key leaders (in which it appears to be succeeding).
41
 The 
2009 merger of Saudi and Yemeni Al Qaeda branches has effectively transformed Al 
Qaeda from a local chapter to a regional franchise, designed specifically to allow the 
group to expand its operations abroad much like Al Qaeda‘s organization in 
Afghanistan.
42
 
Despite the relative dearth of information regarding the organizational inner 
workings of AQAP, according to Barak Barfi, it is both compartmentalized and 
hierarchical. However, AQAP is decentralized enough to ensure the organization‘s 
survival even when individual nodes are eliminated or removed. It includes a political 
leader that provides strategic direction for the organization, a military chief to plan 
operations, an increasingly prominent propaganda wing that operates a number of 
AQAP‘s publications, and a religious branch that ensures that AQAP‘s operations follow 
its ideological narrative.
43
 Bin Laden and Zawahiri utilize their propaganda instrument Al 
Sahab to provide AQAP with general strategic direction by identifying target priorities 
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and without giving specific instructions.
44
 Although specifics are unknown, it is likely 
that AQAP maintains little direct communication with Al Qaeda central for security 
reasons.
45
 As was the case in Iraq, by granting operational autonomy to regional 
branches, Al Qaeda risks alienating supporters if these branches deviate from the Al 
Qaeda playbook.  
To overcome this, familial relations, in addition to shared faith and ideology, 
allow AQAP to maintain tribe like connections with Al Qaeda central. For example, al-
Wahayshi served as bin Laden‘s personal secretary in Afghanistan, and this has helped to 
cement strategic ties between Al Qaeda central and AQAP. Militants in Yemen often 
have familial connections with Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and Pakistan, thereby 
ensuring strong ideological ties within the organization.
46
 Al Wahayshi‘s relationship 
with bin Laden, as well as the fact that most of AQAP‘s senior leadership has either 
fought or trained in Afghanistan also serves as an effective recruiting tool.  
AQAP’s Ideological Pillars, Propaganda Campaign, and Western Recruitment 
AQAP is waging a coordinated propaganda campaign aimed at maintaining local 
relevance by adjusting its global ideology to fit local grievances. Recent events also 
suggest that the group is turning its attention toward a global audience and the 
recruitment of Westerners. Today‘s AQAP is believed to be comprised of three groups: 
Yemenis (56 percent), Saudis (37 percent), and a mixed bag of foreign recruits (7 
percent). According to Murad al-Shishani, Yemeni recruits are represented roughly 
equally across the North and South, indicating AQAP‘s ability to generate popularity 
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across sectarian divides in an area roughly half the size of Yemen.
47
  AQAP‘s primary 
method of drawing in recruits and maintaining local relevance is through its coordinated 
and comprehensive propaganda campaign.  
In Yemen, AQAP‘s narrative is consistent with the core tenets of Al Qaeda, while 
also incorporating themes that resonate with the tribal communities, including grievances 
of government persecution, marginalization, and economic depravity. This has effectively 
created a ‗glocalization‘ of events, by connecting local grievances with Al Qaeda‘s global 
ideology.
48
 This also includes addressing issues of relevance to the broader Muslim 
world, such as events in Palestine and Gaza, and the Guantanamo military detention 
center (the majority of inmates are Yemeni nationals). Al Qaeda also seeks to address the 
numerous social, demographic, and economic issues of Yemen that are of direct 
relevance to the local population, including the government‘s corruption, the inability of 
the Saleh administration to provide for its citizens, issues of natural resource depletion, 
and the uneven distribution of wealth. Thus, consistent with Al Qaeda‘s professed 
position as a vanguard of the global jihadist movement, Al Qaeda positions itself as a 
sympathetic leader of reform.
49
   
 AQAP‘s propaganda arm uses a variety of media to broadcast it ideological 
message throughout the region and abroad. Its flagship publication, called Sada al-
Malahim or Echo of Battles (which has been reportedly discontinued), includes 
everything from details on how to avoid divulging information during interrogation, to 
reviews of weapons, explosives, and offers explanations of world events (such as the 
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global recession) in the light of jihadist ideology.
50
 By addressing local issues, AQAP is 
able to resonate so heavily with the local population that according to Gregory Johnsen, it 
is the most representative organization in Yemen because it transcends class and tribal 
distinctions.
51
 Though AQAP‘s proselytizing is not theologically sound, there are few 
religious scholars who are able to speak out against it. Local Sheiks and religious clerics 
that preach against Al Qaeda have not achieved as broad a following as AQAP, 
essentially allowing AQAP to dominate Yemen‘s ―virtual space‖. With little ideological 
pushback, AQAP is able to recast accidental killings of civilians in such a way that it 
maintains good rapport with the local tribes.
52
 
AQAP has also woven its narrative into Yemen‘s two major internal conflicts. 
The group has expressed a marked distrust of the North, and is believed to have 
developed contacts with the Southern secessionist movement as evidenced by AQAP‘s 
recent calls for alignment with the Southern cause.
53
 At this point, however, the 
relationship between Southern Sheiks and Al Qaeda is unclear. Although a number of 
Southern leaders are known to have fought with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan alongside 
current Al Qaeda members. Although Southern leaders mostly dismiss their alleged ties 
to Al Qaeda, as the violence continues in the South, it is likely that AQAP could try to 
capitalize on this.
54
 The group also presents the Northern Houthi movement in a way that 
capitalizes on the fear of the expansion of Shia Islam and Iranian influence.
55
 The 
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Houthis however, have limited motivations and although they share some anti-Western 
sentiment with AQAP, they do not have international aims and do not wish to upset Saudi 
ethnic groups. The Houthis‘ intolerant view of expanding Salafi and Wahhabi influence 
makes them unlikely to ally themselves with Al Qaeda barring a major paradigm shift.
56
  
AQAP‘s propaganda also targets foreigners, and particularly individuals from the 
US and Western Europe. In July 2009, AQAP launched its English language magazine 
Inspire, which, likely written by American jihadists and Al Qaeda members Anwar al 
Awlaki and Samir Khan, includes much of the same propaganda as Echo of Battles 
though directed toward a Western audience.
57
 Because of his American citizenship and 
professed belief in jihad, Awlaki is able to connect to Western Muslims in a way that 
other AQAP members cannot.  He uses social media such as Twitter, Paltalk, as well as 
postings in Inspire. Awlaki has connected with individuals including Nidal Hasan and 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, allegedly inspiring them to carry out their respective attacks.
58
 It 
was not until the latter occurred that US counterterrorism officials identified AQAP as an 
organization with global ambitions.
59
 The fact that Abdulmutallab received his training in 
Yemen illustrates that while Al Qaeda central‘s operational and recruiting capabilities 
decline, AQAP seems poised to pick up the slack in recruiting and training individual 
cells. Other inspired followers include Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (aka Carlos 
Bledsoe), the self radicalized Little Rock Arkansas military recruiting office shooter, 
who, after converting to Islam as a teenager travelled to Yemen where he alleges to have 
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been recruited by AQAP.
60
 AQAP increasingly demonstrates itself as willing and able to 
recruit grassroots jihadists into the Al Qaeda network through its propaganda.  
AQAP’s Exploitation of and Integration into Local Tribes 
Given the prominence of tribal society throughout Yemen, the illicit economies 
they support, and the sanctuary they can provide, AQAP is currently taking steps toward 
integrating itself into tribal communities. Although Al Qaeda‘s core message essentially 
advocates anarchy, learning from its failures in Iraq and successes in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, AQAP is trying to work more closely with tribal leaders rather than displace 
them.
61
 In a joint statement made by Zawahiri and al Wahayshi in February 2009, both Al 
Qaeda leaders called on the local tribes of Yemen to resist the Yemeni government and to 
provide support to AQAP members.
62
 It is likely that Al Qaeda members have brought 
families into Yemen from abroad, in an attempt to further integrate into the local 
communities.
63
  
AQAP‘s attempts at integrating into Yemeni tribes also serve an operational 
purpose. Deep seated ties with local movements, as Al Qaeda has accomplished in 
Central Asia with groups like Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar e Taiba, help facilitate 
operational coordination between groups. Recruits into one organization can quickly be 
seconded to AQAP, which will then use these recruits to achieve its own operational 
objectives. This effectively makes any intervention on the government‘s part a double 
edged sword where they are fighting allied tribes and Al Qaeda members who are often 
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indistinguishable. This also plays into what David Kilcullen describes as the ―accidental 
guerilla syndrome‖, where locals may join the fight not out of any particular ideological 
loyalty to Al Qaeda, but because they are being attacked by an outside force. This could 
potentially ignite small scale counterterrorism operations into a large scale war of tribes 
versus the government. 
AQAP has achieved tribal integration through marriage, exploitation of tribes‘ 
complex social relations, civil laws, and cultural norms, and by weaving its global 
Salafist agenda into more palatable local grievances. Again, despite its ideological 
tension with a number of Yemen‘s factions, Al Qaeda has made significant efforts to 
adopt a softer attitude with its ideological enemies. Although AQAP has established a 
presence in areas that are predominately Sunni, it has adopted a softer attitude toward the 
Zaydi Shia in the north by emphasizing the admirable elements of its ideology and 
separating it from the Huthis (which AQAP is opposed to).
64
 Because of the blood ties 
shared by members of tribes, integrating into them is not difficult, and can be 
accomplished through marriage. Therefore AQAP is actively marrying into tribes in an 
effort to establish an organic and integrated presence in the country.  
AQAP also exploits tribal customs as a means of gaining sanctuary. According to 
a tribal Sheik in the Mar‘ib governate of eastern Yemen, where Al Qaeda maintains a 
large presence, Yemeni tribes will usually refuse to hand over fellow tribesman 
regardless of the charges brought against them. This is because the tribes (which have a 
distinctly different judicial system than the state) believe that the government cannot 
provide accurate justice, and that the suspect will not be able to defend himself 
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adequately. Because tribal identity is collective, the decision of an individual tribesman to 
turn over an AQAP member is reflective of the entire tribe. Shared ideology between the 
tribes and Al Qaeda, such as anger against Western influence, also makes tribes less 
willing to hand over AQAP militants. Tribes that have a good relationship with the 
government are more likely to give up AQAP members, though this is in no way 
guaranteed. It is particularly difficult for tribes to turn over Al Qaeda members if they 
have familial ties to the tribe. Outsiders will sometimes bribe tribal leaders into offering 
safe haven, though this relationship to the tribe offers little assurance to the Al Qaeda 
member who may be turned over if government authorities will offer a larger bribe.
65
 
Despite these facilitating conditions, Al Qaeda faces some challenges among 
Yemen‘s tribes. The two predominant tribes are the Bakil and Hashid; the Bakil are 
Yemen‘s largest tribal confederation. Due to their familial connections to the Yemeni 
president, both tribes have rejected Al Qaeda‘s attempts to recruit within their 
communities. Moreover, even those tribes that have embraced Al Qaeda will shift 
alliances when it is beneficial to do so.
66
 In Yemen, the balance of power between tribes, 
or between tribes and the central government, has oscillated over time.
67
  The tribes tend 
to act out of their own self interest and are flexible about breaking and forming alliances. 
This creates opportunities for Al Qaeda, but means tribes may turn against the 
organization with little warning. 
Weaknesses of Al Qaeda’s Approach 
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Despite AQAP‘s short term successes in establishing an integrated local presence, 
the organization‘s long term strategy is inherently at odds with those of its local clients 
and partners. AQAP is little more than a pipeline to channel the entrenched grievances of 
its Yemeni supporters, and it is not clear that the group will be able to mobilize enough 
tribal support for it to be able to maintain a lasting presence in the country. As Sarah 
Phillips from the Carnegie Endowment points out, AQAP‘s global political objective is to 
establish an alternative to political control (via Sharia ruled society) in an ungoverned 
Yemen. In order for AQAP to achieve its global objectives, it will require more territory 
and political influence, and thus could potentially find itself in competition with Yemeni 
tribes. This inherent conflict between local and global objectives prevented Al Qaeda 
from achieving sanctuary in Bosnia and Chechnya. If this occurs, AQAP could 
potentially lose its client relationship with the tribes, thereby risking its own physical 
security and ensuring its demise (as was the case in 2000-2002 when the group did not 
integrate with the tribes).
68
 Although AQAP is thus far proving able to work across 
Yemen‘s many political and ideological divides, its ultimate goal of establishing a pan 
Islamic caliphate steps on more toes than hands it shakes. Even in the south, where 
AQAP has its largest contingent, secessionist goals are inherently at odds with Al 
Qaeda‘s ideology, and Southerners are unlikely to support strict Sharia governance.69 The 
tendency of Al Qaeda to use overwhelming violence could also potentially alienate 
Yemeni tribes. At the same time, by adopting a more sympathetic and less radical stance 
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on the Zaydi Shia of the north, AQAP risks alienating its Sunni supporters in Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, and abroad.
70
 
This implies that AQAP must necessarily drop some of its international objectives 
rather than merely tone them down. Al Qaeda sees its regional branches (particularly 
AQAP) as a means of aggregating the effects of isolated insurgencies to establish a global 
Islamic caliphate. By keeping its hard lined global ideology, it risks local alienation. In 
the absence of a cohesive ideology within a full matrix network (like the current Al 
Qaeda network), AQAP risks becoming less relevant to the overall Al Qaeda 
organization. If this occurs, AQAP could very well transform into a local insurgent 
movement, eventually losing its Al Qaeda identity entirely. Returning to the conditions 
Ronfeldt and Arquilla outline as necessary for an organization to maintain effectiveness, 
we see that AQAP does have a favorable social base and access to technological 
infrastructure. While it is difficult to know exactly how cohesive the AQAP organization 
is from the little information available about its internal structure, it is safe to assume that 
the organization is well connected, although highly decentralized to maintain physical 
safety. If this is the case, even if AQAP eventually loses its Al Qaeda identity, it could 
very well continue to attack foreign targets, absent a significant loss in leadership. On the 
other hand, if targeting foreign countries invites an intervention that could potentially 
disturb Al Qaeda‘s support base, AQAP could very well discontinue operations abroad. 
Conclusion 
 AQAP has exploited the various tribal, demographic, economic, religious, and 
domestic security cleavages in Yemen to establish an integrated local presence. The 
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organization itself its well organized, hierarchical, and maintains at least strategic and 
ideological connections to Al Qaeda central. Of particular importance is AQAP‘s proven 
ability to recruit and operate at a global level. Although AQAP is plagued by long term 
strategic problems, if the organization is able to overcome them (regardless of whether or 
not it retains its Al Qaeda identity), it could very well continue to launch operations 
against US and Western interests in the future. 
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Chapter 4: Al Qaeda in the UK  
In contrast to AQAP‘s operations in Yemen, Al Qaeda has established a diffuse 
network throughout the UK by leveraging its connections through its regional branches 
and affiliated insurgent groups, and by recruiting grassroots followers. This very different 
approach is due to the unique environment in the UK. However, this strategy has faltered, 
as the British government has ramped up domestic intelligence gathering and policing 
efforts, leaving Al Qaeda increasingly reliant on ideologically inspired individuals who 
maintain few if any direct ties to the organization.  
 The first section of this chapter aims at identifying the environmental conditions 
conducive to the presence of Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups. The second section will 
look at how Al Qaeda has exploited these factors to achieve a limited organizational 
presence in the UK, while the third section briefly considers some of the negative 
environmental factors (such as policing) that impede upon Al Qaeda‘s ability to operate 
in the UK. The final portion of this chapter identifies similarities between Al Qaeda‘s 
operations in Britain and its current operations in the US.  
Environmental Factors that Contribute to Al Qaeda’s Presence in the UK 
In order to understand how Al Qaeda has achieved a limited presence in the UK, 
it is necessary to address three key environmental factors: Britain‘s demographic makeup 
and the political sensitivities of Muslims; British civil law and cultural policies; and the 
presence of Islamic organizations.  
Demographic and Religious Makeup, and Political Outlook of Britain’s Muslim 
Communities  
Muslims represent the largest religious minority in the UK, have the youngest age 
profile of any minority or ethnic group in Britain, and are generally the most 
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disadvantaged.
1
 Most of the UK‘s immigrant communities trace their origins to the 
former British colonial territories of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi communities, which make up roughly two thirds of the Muslim community 
in the UK, have a significantly higher incidence of economic and social disadvantage 
than any other Muslim ethnic group. This is not to discount other ethnic groups, as 
jihadists also come from the Middle East and Africa and include some Caucasian 
converts to Islam.
2
 Muslim communities also have the highest proportion of workless 
children in the household (30 to 40 percent), low levels of civic participation and 
volunteering in the local community, and generally have mixed attitudes toward 
integration, largely as a result of their struggle to reconcile their modern Islamic identity 
with secular British society.
3
 Displacement caused by urbanization has also created 
significant tensions between Muslim communities and the state.
4
 
Second-generation British Muslims, who fit into neither their parents‘ country of 
origin nor the UK and face significantly higher unemployment rates, are particularly 
susceptible to recruitment into jihadist networks. The generous British welfare state 
makes it possible for the unemployed to continue to spend time on the internet or attend 
small religious group sessions, and this is particularly dangerous when individuals isolate 
themselves in internet chat rooms or religious study groups.
5
 According to Marc 
Sageman, boredom, especially amongst unemployed or student youth, is a major factor in 
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drawing grassroots followers into the global jihadist network.
6
 It is important to note, 
however, that while many jihadists come from poverty and lack education, just as many 
are well educated and employed. In fact, well educated individuals are just as susceptible 
to proselytizing as those who are less educated.
7
 While no single factor can account for 
radicalization, boredom, personal crisis, and a need for a sense of fulfillment are the usual 
suspects. Al Qaeda recruiters thus actively target a wide range of individuals from 
affluent middle class to economically impoverished British Muslims.
8
 
The religious predispositions of these communities are also an important factor. 
Even within the British Muslim community there are religious divisions relevant to 
terrorism. Bangladeshi Muslims, for example, practice Sufism, a more moderate form of 
Islam. They are far less susceptible to Al Qaeda recruitment than are Pakistani 
immigrants who generally tend to practice more fundamentalist offshoots of Sunni 
Islam.
9
 These more conservative elements give Al Qaeda an ideological and political 
window through which it can recruit. Moreover, these more conservative elements tend to 
be treated with suspicion and perceived as terrorists even when they are not.  This 
increases their alienation and is almost a self-fulfilling prophecy. Such alienation is 
worsened by police partnerships with the more moderate Sufi communities; more 
conservative Muslims believe they are routinely painted as ‗the bad guys‘.10 
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 Another exploitable source of alienation is the connection of domestic political 
grievances to global issues. That is, Muslims perceive a significant double standard in 
British foreign policy where although Britain champions democracy abroad, Muslims at 
home continue to suffer from economic impoverishment, lack of job opportunities, racial 
profiling, and an inability to vent those frustrations publicly.
11
 A recent study, conducted 
by Brendan O‘Duffy at the University of London, shows a noticeable correlation between 
domestic concerns, such as unemployment and British Muslims‘ feelings about global 
political issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Yemen, Western policy toward 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Russian policy in the Caucasus. According to the study, 
some British Muslims attributed their own economic mobility to a broader ―Zionist 
conspiracy‖, that they see reflected in British foreign relations (such as the invasion of 
Iraq, or policies toward Israel).
12
 It is no surprise that many homegrown radicals have 
adopted an Al Qaeda inspired global ideology. The Facebook page of recent Stockholm 
suicide bomber Taimour al-Abdaly, who previously lived and studied at a university in 
the UK for several years, had videos of Iraqi‘s being abused by American soldiers as well 
as a series on "Russian war crimes in Chechnya".
13
 As the case of Yemen illustrated, Al 
Qaeda‘s ability to connect local issues to global ones is important in determining the 
group‘s relevance to that particular country. 
Britain’s National Policy of Multiculturalism and Lenient Civil Laws 
 Britain‘s national policy of multiculturalism is intended to protect immigrant 
communities‘ sociocultural identities by allowing them to freely practice their own 
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customs. The logic of this policy focuses on promoting tolerance and discouraging 
discrimination. For example, and in stark contrast to France‘s new policy, Muslim 
women may veil themselves in public. Multiculturalism, originally implemented out of 
the need to integrate England‘s early immigrant communities, including Scots, Irish, and 
Welsh, in recent years has effectively segregated Muslim communities from secular 
British society to such a degree that they essentially function outside of mainstream daily 
life.
14
 In effect, this has entrenched cultural identities at the cost of a collective national 
identity (something that the US, in contrast, has proven remarkably adept at cultivating), 
creating defacto urban tribalism in some parts of the country in the form of small, 
alienated, and psychologically-isolated immigrant communities.
15
  
Compounding the effects of this policy, Britain‘s lenient civil laws and strong 
legal protections of free speech, religion, and privacy not only have attracted large 
numbers of radical clerics and Middle Eastern dissidents to the UK, but have made it 
extremely difficult to preemptively respond to terrorism.
16
 During the 1980s and 1990s, 
numerous foreign extremists, some of whom were expelled by their own countries for 
radical behavior, set up shop in London, creating an overseas base of operations for their 
movements. This was possible because of Britain‘s nearly automatic asylum granting 
policy.
17
 Given the degree of leniency in the UK, even individuals with ties to terrorist or 
radical Islamist groups are unlikely to be deported. Violent radical groups, who hide 
under the disguise of peaceful Islamic political movements, take advantage of this.
18
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Moreover, because it is a subtle shift from a ‗peaceful‘ theological subscription, to 
jihadist ideology, and then to becoming a terrorist, Britain‘s lenient policies make it 
difficult to preemptively address this jump from extremism in theory to extremism in 
practice. This puts the UK security services in a more reactive position. These legal 
impediments, however, are far from unique to Britain and are characteristic of all 
democracies combating homegrown terrorism.  
While the British government has sought to reach out to Muslim communities and 
maintain vigilant intelligence-gathering and policing, any counterinsurgency or 
counterterrorist operation will involve heavy handed tactics that potentially risk 
alienating individuals, thereby compounding existing problems. British domestic security 
forces have been wary of their experience in Northern Ireland, but in seeking to avoid 
actions that might alienate moderate Muslims, they have contributed to a low rate of 
successful prosecutions of terrorist suspects.
19
  
Presence of Peaceful and Radical Islamic Organizations and Networks 
A number of neo-fundamentalist faith and activist communities have arisen in 
Britain.
20
 While many of these are moderate groups that provide a cathartic and vocal 
pressure valve for the anxieties and frustrations of disenchanted Muslims, others have 
developed affiliations with violent groups, and an even smaller number have embraced 
jihadist ideology.
21
 Regardless of their intentions, however, wittingly or unwittingly all of 
these organizations provide a source of recruits for radical groups. 
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According to 2008 British intelligence documents, there are currently an 
estimated 200 terrorist networks functioning within the UK, many of which have 
developed extensive roots in the UK over the past 30 years.
22
 These included Harakat Al-
Ittijah Al-Islami (Islamic Tendancy Movment), Harakat Al Nahda (Movement for 
Rebirth), the London-based Tunisian jihadist magazine al-Minhaj (The Method), and 
numerous others. Salafist Saudi ―Islamic awakening movements‖ also emerged. One such 
group, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), claimed that it was 
the ideological voice for the Al Qaeda organization in the UK.
23
  The Advice and 
Reformation Committee (ARC) served as a propaganda hub established by Osama Bin 
Laden in July 1994 and operated until 1998. It also allegedly supported Al Qaeda 
central‘s military activities, including the recruitment of operatives, disbursement of 
funds, and transfer of equipment and services.
24
 The Algerian based Groupe Salafist pour 
la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), now known as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM after their merger in 2006) appears to have shifted to France, but is 
likely to have had cells operating in the UK after many radicals from affiliated group 
GIA (which maintained an extensive presence throughout British schools and Mosques) 
transferred to GSPC in the 1990s.
25
 Al Muhajiroun (The Emigrants), which operated in 
the UK from 1986 to 2005, used to recruit students and provided funds for a variety of 
fundamentalist cells abroad. Although al Muhajiroun has been routinely disbanded, it 
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consistently resurrects itself disguised as new organizations.
26
 Although these groups 
may not have direct ties to Al Qaeda they share similar ideologies and through their 
abundance of social contacts abroad, can help facilitate individuals‘ gradual transition 
from peaceful to more radical groups. This will ultimately provide opportunities for Al 
Qaeda. 
Aside from radical Islamist organizations, an assortment of radical mosques also 
facilitate recruitment, including the Finsbury Park and East London mosques, known for 
spreading radical Islamist propaganda and encouraging recruitment into the global 
jihad.
27
 Many radical Muslim Imams and spiritual leaders are foreigners, possess very 
few qualifications, have little knowledge of secular British society, and preach jihadism. 
Radical preachers such as Abu Qatada, Omar Bakri Mohammad and others are known by 
MI5 to have been directly involved in using Al Qaeda ideology in British mosques to 
incite violence and encourage individuals to join Al Qaeda.
28
 In the UK, as in Yemen, Al 
Qaeda exploits the legitimate grievances of individuals to rationalize its global agenda. 
Even fundamentalist Mosques that serve legitimate purposes can move individuals 
ideologically closer to potential recruitment.
29
  
British universities are also thought to be exploited by terror groups as a source of 
recruitment. Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day underwear bomber, studied at the 
University College London and was the head of the college‘s Islamic Society (ISOC), 
where he may have been drawn to radical Islam.
30
 From 2009 to 2010 ISOC, led by 
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South Asian Salafists, routinely hosted jihadist sermons and continued to re-publish the 
writings of Anwar al-Awlaki and others affiliated with Al Qaeda.
31
 At universities across 
the UK, small lecture groups and campus Islamist clubs like ISOC frequently provide the 
means for like minded individuals to network with one another. Through guest teachers 
or visiting ‗scholars‘, student participants can develop connections to foreign jihadist 
networks not unlike the typical networking that occurs in an everyday job search.   
Al Qaeda in the UK 
 Al Qaeda‘s network in the UK has leveraged connections with its organizational 
affiliates, but particularly its ability to inspire grassroots followers. To understand this 
dynamic, this section looks at Al Qaeda‘s organizational structure, recruitment methods, 
connections to Central Asia, and places these trends in the context of the 7/7 London 
bombing cell. 
Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure in the UK 
Al Qaeda in Britain lacks the centralized and hierarchical command and control 
structure of AQAP, largely because it is denied the ability to operate with the same 
unimpeded access that it enjoys in Yemen. This is due in no small part to the 
effectiveness of Britain‘s domestic security and intelligence services, which has forced Al 
Qaeda to rely on an informal network of recruits that it draws from its regional branches, 
affiliated movements such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Pakistani Taliban (which Al Qaeda 
cooperates with operationally), and a cadre of self radicalized, ideologically inspired 
followers. Guided by Al Qaeda propaganda, these individuals are typically less 
dangerous because they lack operational direction from Al Qaeda cells as well as access 
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to training and weapons.  As they lack social ties, ‗secondary followers‘ are less 
predictable and more difficult to find. Given Al Qaeda‘s ‗ideological‘ connections with 
its secondary followers, this also gives Al Qaeda the appearance of a having a larger 
presence than it actually does. 
Al Qaeda also maintains a number of directly controlled operational cells who 
carry out attacks.
 32
 The limited number of cells that are directly controlled by Al Qaeda 
appear to be taking on a similar structure to those of the IRA in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Each group is commanded by an organizer, a planner that maintains control over the 
members of the groups, and individuals responsible for the procurement of operational 
and tactical items such as explosives and firearms.
33
 Some cells are formed independently 
while others are formed with the help of sleeper cells connected to Al Qaeda.
34
 These 
cells operate with relative independence, both logistically and financially (often times 
relying on criminal activity to procure funds), although core leadership in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan appears to direct the operations of these cells, most often via the internet.
35
 
For example, shoe bomber Richard Reid maintained close email contact with an 
extensive network of individuals in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and France.
36
 However these 
cells appear to be more of the exception rather than the rule as most Al Qaeda recruitment 
occurs at the grassroots level. According to Peter Neumann, Al Qaeda recruits already 
subscribe to jihadist ideology (typically through the venues previously mentioned: 
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mosques, universities, radical groups), and then over the course of a number of years 
reach out to sleeper cells who then provide operational direction. In this way moving to a 
training camp abroad is a logical next step in a gradual, self started process.
37
  
Recruitment and Al Qaeda’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Connection in the UK 
Al Qaeda currently relies on a number of means for recruiting individuals into its 
loose UK network, particularly internet propaganda (self radicalization) and facilitator 
cells. Indeed, while these are not the only methods used (radical preachers are used too), 
they are by far the most exploited. In what Neumann refers to as the UK‘s counterculture 
environment, propaganda videos from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and increasingly 
Yemen (AQAP‘s English magazine Inspire routinely addresses its broad messages to the 
West) are used to inspire grassroots followers. A striking example of this is Mohammad 
Irfan Raja, who, self radicalized on a wealth of extremist propaganda including videos of 
suicide bombings in Iraq, jihadist songs, and texts (all of which he obtained via the 
internet), joined up with four young men from Bradford to travel to the Pakistani Frontier 
Province. Via internet blogs and jihadist websites, Raja came into contact with a 17 year 
old American student from New Jersey named ―Ali‖, who connected him to the 
―Bradford four‖, and another Briton named Imran, who gave the men advice on 
counterintelligence. All four men spent considerable time in their homes or college dorm 
rooms frequenting jihadist websites, some likely run by Al Qaeda.
38
 This case illustrates 
both the complexity of connections within the jihadist social network, but also the unclear 
role that Al Qaeda plays in recruitment and radicalization. Although it is known that Al 
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Qaeda propaganda has frequently been cited in the copy cat messages of jihadist groups, 
it is still impossible (and will likely never be known except to the perpetrators) as to how 
much influence Al Qaeda played in facilitating their radicalization. This is likely also an 
indication that with greater pressure by British security and intelligence services, Al 
Qaeda relies increasingly on developing a cadre of secondary recruits with little or no 
direct ties to the organization.
39
 
Al Qaeda has also relied on covert facilitator cells both to proliferate propaganda 
and facilitate recruitment.
40
 Younes Tsouli, a Moroccan immigrant from West London 
under the alias Irhabi007, served as a key conduit for proliferating and repackaging Al 
Qaeda propaganda in the West from 2004 to 2007. Tsouli, a frequenter of jihadist 
websites, and avid reader of extremist material started out as a freelance activist, posting 
hacking manuals and jihadist propaganda on websites from 2003 to 2004. After catching 
the eye of senior leaders of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Tsouli soon became one of AQI‘s 
primary propaganda distributors by building and running a myriad of Al Qaeda websites, 
converting homemade videos to various formats (such as for mobile phones) and 
disseminating Al Qaeda propaganda to as wide an audience as possible.
41
 Tsouli 
maintained connections with self-radicalized individuals from across the globe, and 
through the password protected message boards and forums he ran for Al Qaeda before 
his arrest in 2007, facilitated intelligence gathering for AQI and connected individuals 
from across the West (including Canada, US, UK among others) to AQI in ways that 
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would have been otherwise difficult.42 Funding for the operation was facilitated by two 
other Britons who relied on stolen credit cards to set up new websites (some of which 
were on American servers) on which the three men could post AQI propaganda.
43  
Although the internet has proven crucial in radicalizing individuals and/or connect 
them to the broader Al Qaeda network, online interactions cannot fully replace real world 
interactions. Therefore operational facilitators are necessary who can help individuals 
receive training overseas. An interesting comparison is the two towns of Luton and 
Bradford. Both cities have large Pakistani Muslim communities. While Bradford is 
economically more deprived than Luton, it has graduated fewer terrorists largely because 
Luton is known to have had more Al Qaeda middle men who facilitate recruitment.
44
 
Familial contacts have also played an important role in facilitating travel and recruitment 
overseas. Although 7/7 cell leader Mohammad Sidique Khan was an alleged facilitator, it 
is extremely difficult to identify these individuals largely because of the discretion they 
employ while maintaining contact with Al Qaeda elements overseas. For example, 
Mohammad Qayum Khan, also an alleged facilitator, has yet to be charged for lack of 
sufficient evidence. 
 As mentioned in Chapter Two, following US led operations in Afghanistan, Al 
Qaeda central‘s command and control operations shifted to relative security in the lawless 
Pakistan border regions. This has allowed Al Qaeda to tap into social networks that 
connect Pakistani mujahedeen and militia fighters with Britain‘s large Pakistani 
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population (who make 40,000 annual visits to relatives in Pakistan).
45
 Many British 
Pakistanis come from districts within the same proximity in Kashmir, and individuals 
routinely travel to that region to receive training from one of the many groups operating 
there. In addition to those mentioned earlier, these include Jaish-e Mohammed, Pakistani 
Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Therefore, nearly all of the major terrorist plots or 
operations in the UK have been associated with paramilitary and guerilla training in this 
region.
46
 These militias frequently merge operations and work with each other (including 
Al Qaeda) to such a degree that it is unclear whether multiple groups within the same 
geographical area are really separate entities, or one group. As in Yemen it may be 
virtually impossible to distinguish between local militia members and members of Al 
Qaeda central. According to Marc Sageman, although Al Qaeda central in Pakistan 
essentially operates as one of a number of businesses in a growing network of jihadists, 
Al Qaeda functions as the Harvard of jihadist groups in that because of its selectivity, 
individuals are often trained by one group and then merge into Al Qaeda.
47
  
7/7 London Bombing Cell 
 A glance at London 7/7 bombing cell illustrates many of the points made in this 
chapter so far, including cell organization, means of training, political motivation, and 
connection to Al Qaeda central. The cell consisted of a leader, Mohammad Sidique Khan, 
a 30 year old son of Pakistani immigrants, along with three other men between the ages 
of 18 to 22.
48
 It is likely that connections through local mosques or online chat groups 
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helped facilitate networking between the individuals involved in the attack.  According to 
a released MI5 intelligence report, in 2003 Khan‘s group likely lead a facilitation network 
providing logistical and financial support to Al Qaeda in Pakistan.
49
 Prior to the attack, at 
least two cell members (including Khan) traveled to Pakistan in 2003 where they 
attended some sort of training camp and were likely in contact with Al Qaeda central 
leadership.
50
 Although the degree to which the operation was coordinated from foreign 
Al Qaeda operatives remains unclear, it is known that Khan maintained contact with 
Mohammad Qayum Khan, or ―Q‖, an alleged facilitator engaged in ―charity work‖ and 
who is said to have had ties to senior Al Qaeda lieutenants in Afghanistan.
51
 Although 
lacking clear information about the case, British intelligence services judge it likely that 
the bombers were directed by unknown Al Qaeda elements overseas.
52
  
In 2005, Al Jazeera released a video of Mohammad Sidique Khan in which he 
expressed a commitment to jihadist ideology in defense of Islam. Khan also praised 
Ayman Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, with Zawahiri subsequently praising the attack 
in the ―enemy‘s land‖ in a separate recording. Although Zawahiri also claimed 
responsibility for the attack, it remains unclear (at least publicly) whether this is true.
53
 
Post attack investigations sponsored by the British government revealed clear links 
between Western foreign policy in the Middle East and the expressed ideology of the 
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attackers (similar to the connection made by AQAP to local events in Yemen to mobilize 
followers toward global objectives).
54
  
Environmental Factors that Mitigate Al Qaeda’s Presence in the UK   
In addition to British counterterrorism efforts, the UK has also taken on a number 
of proactive initiatives designed to curb radicalization. Following 9/11 and the 7/7 
London attacks, the British government has been waging what is effectively a hearts and 
minds campaign hinged on outreach to British Muslim communities and designed to 
foster civic participation. This includes a number of Muslim outreach groups, including 
New Scotland Yard‘s Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), composed of both Muslim and non-
Muslim police officers designed to reach out to minority Muslim communities. A Muslim 
Safety forum was also established, allowing the Muslim community a venue through 
which they can express grievances and propose civil policy changes. The Home Office 
and Foreign Office have also funded moderate Muslim scholars to tour through the UK 
and give lectures in local mosques.
55
 On a similar note, the British government has also 
been looking to encourage the development of homegrown Imams in mosques throughout 
the country, rather than relying on foreign Imams who, as mentioned earlier, are often 
under qualified and lack knowledge about secular British society.
56
 The MCU has 
supported various community outreach efforts with Muslim youth communities, 
including student groups, designed to counter Al Qaeda propaganda by hearing various 
concerns regarding UK foreign and civil policies (especially antiterrorism measures).
57
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Other measures have included adopting new English language and citizenship 
requirements, and including citizenship study as a compulsory part of the British national 
educational curriculum in secondary schools.
58
 David Cameron, in his first speech on 
radicalization and the causes of terrorism, called for an end to Britain‘s longstanding 
policy of multiculturalism in favor of new national policies aimed at promoting a unified 
national identity.
59
 As previously noted, this is precisely because multiculturalism has 
created social and psychological niches that radical groups can exploit by cementing 
immigrant identities at the cost of a cohesive national identity. This appears to be the goal 
of many of Britain‘s most recent initiatives. 
UK security services, including Scotland Yard, MI5, MI6, and Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) (British equivalent of the US National Security 
Agency) have dramatically ramped up policing and intelligence gathering efforts since 
the 7/7 bombings. Increased staffing and budget levels, in addition to closer intelligence 
partnerships with the US and other European countries have made it increasingly difficult 
for Al Qaeda to recruit and operate within the UK.
60
  Tighter border controls, and less 
stringent deportation laws have reportedly seen some success. British security services 
have achieved a higher level of penetration of terrorist organizations within the UK, and 
when considering the number of extremist networks throughout the country, the lack of a 
successful Al Qaeda terrorist attack in the past five years is an indication of the relative 
success of the British government‘s efforts thus far.61 It remains unclear however, as to 
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how successful the British government‘s hearts and minds campaign has been. While 
some polls seem to indicate that support for jihadist ideology remains strong throughout 
the country, others, including a 2010 Pew report, indicate that this remains a minority 
view.
62
 At the same time, many publicly available polls fail to give an accurate picture of 
the subject due to biased sampling or incomplete data gathering.  
Homegrown Jihadism and Al Qaeda in the US 
Recent trends in grassroots jihadist recruiting in the United States by Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates closely mirror those of the UK. While Al Qaeda lacks an organizational 
presence in the US, it has proven able to recruit and operationally control a number of 
American recruits through three venues: its affiliates, the ideologically guided Al Qaeda 
network, as well as Al Qaeda central and its regional branches. As in the UK, Al Qaeda 
exploits internet based propaganda as its primary means of radicalization and recruitment, 
allowing radicalization to occur increasingly autonomously. American jihadists also 
appear to represent increasingly diverse social and demographic backgrounds, with the 
latest wave of jihadist recruits lacking physical or familial ties abroad. Despite America‘s 
―melting pot‖ social mentality, in contrast to British multiculturalism, the US is not 
exempt from the level of radicalization seen in the UK. Al Qaeda‘s increased reliance on 
operatives with little ties to the main organization (including regional branches) is part of 
the group‘s focus on waging more frequent small scale attacks against the US.   
Firstly, while strategic objectives may differ, the ability of Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates to cooperate to achieve mutual logistical or operational objectives makes it 
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nearly impossible to distinguish between groups which leaves the US vulnerable. Al 
Qaeda has proven able to both generate recruits and operationally coordinate with 
affiliated insurgent or terrorist groups including Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba. 
After developing strong ties with senior Pakistani Taliban leadership through a number of 
trips to the country, Faisal Shazad was quickly recruited, trained, and deployed by the 
group to launch what became the recently failed Times Square attack.
63
 As is the case for 
many British radicals, family connections and tribal ties to Pakistan greatly facilitated 
Shazad‘s recruitment.64 Despite not having targeted the US, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the 
Pakistan based terrorist group and Al Qaeda affiliate, did launch the successful Mumbai 
attack with the help of American recruit David Headley, who was vital to LeT in 
collecting intelligence prior to the attack.
65
 Headley‘s American identity allowed him to 
travel with relative freedom across borders and also attend LeT training camps in 
Pakistan. While LeT is not Al Qaeda, as Phillip Mudd, formerly of CIA‘s 
Counterterrorism Center notes, as these groups enter Al Qaeda‘s ―ideological orbit‖ there 
is an increased tendency for them to operate in much of the same way as Al Qaeda.
66
 In 
recent years, scores of Somali-Americans have travelled to Somalia to train and fight 
with Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab, with some receiving training from Al Qaeda there.
67
 
Secondly and to a more limited extent, Al Qaeda has maintained direct 
operational control over a small number of cells, either through its regional branches such 
as AQAP or Al Qaeda central. Despite the relative decline of Al Qaeda central, it is 
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through these venues that the organization has proven capable of bringing in more 
American recruits over the past several years.
68
 Afghani-American Najibullah Zazi, who 
recently plotted an attack on the New York Subway system, is such an example. 
According to Mudd, individuals with ties to Al Qaeda central‘s leadership are typically 
drawn in after becoming self radicalized. In Zazi's case, he came into contact with Al 
Qaeda recruiters only after arriving in Afghanistan, and like Shazad, Zazi‘s family 
connections to Pakistan helped facilitate recruitment. Though Zazi had originally 
intended to fight for the Taliban, he was quickly seconded to Al Qaeda, and subsequently 
trained to conduct suicide operations in the US.
69
 The plot was reportedly organized by 
senior Al Qaeda leadership overseas, and involved a US based Al Qaeda facilitator cell.
70
 
Similarly, Long Island resident Bryant Neal Vinas, a US Army dropout and convert to 
Islam who joined Al Qaeda‘s ranks in the Waziristan region several years ago, was 
reportedly in contact with a New York man (likely an Al Qaeda facilitator) who helped 
introduce Vinas to his Al Qaeda contacts overseas.
71
  
As in the UK, both of these cases suggest that Al Qaeda relies on a limited 
number of facilitators based in the US to coordinate individuals‘ recruitment into the 
organization‘s central or regional groups.72 It is important to stress that beyond the 
presence of a small number of covert Al Qaeda facilitators, the Al Qaeda organization 
does not appear to have a structured presence in the US. Additionally, according to Brian 
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Michael Jenkins, there are no indications to suggest there is presently an organized 
American terrorist underground either.
73
  
Thirdly, and as previously noted, with the marked decline in Al Qaeda central‘s 
recruitment and operational capabilities, the organization appears to be increasingly 
reliant on its network of secondary, ideologically charged followers with few if any direct 
links to Al Qaeda. An example of this is Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan, a US Army 
psychiatrist who was reportedly in contact with Anwar al-Awlaki (the radical former 
American Imam and current propagandist for AQAP) via email correspondence.
74
 Now 
infamous Colleen LaRose, a Caucasian Pennsylvania woman and Muslim convert also 
known by her online alias ―Jihad Jane‖, appears to have been radicalized by Al Qaeda 
inspired propaganda and YouTube videos. 
In this regard, and as was evident in the UK, Al Qaeda utilizes internet based 
propaganda to recruit grassroots followers in the US. While far from the sole path of 
radicalization, many grassroots jihadists have begun the radicalization process over the 
internet. This is not to discount the value of Mosques and study groups which have also 
played a role in radicalization, though to a lesser degree than in the UK due to Britain‘s 
lenient policies. Media arms from Al Qaeda central, Al Qaeda affiliates, and Al Qaeda 
regional branches are able to lure individuals with jihadist propaganda. Hence, as 
described in a 2007 New York Police Department intelligence report, jihad is consistently 
an autonomous phenomenon with individuals beginning the radicalization process 
independently by exploring jihadist ideology, after which they begin to seek out fellow 
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jihadists and are gradually recruited into Al Qaeda or affiliated groups. As in the UK, 
social, economic, and psychological crisis tend to lead individuals to seek out likeminded 
individuals (through the internet, study groups, etc.) eventually subscribing to jihadist 
ideology.
75
 In this way, recruitment is as much a matter of individuals reaching out to the 
Al Qaeda organization and its affiliates as it is them reaching out to individuals.
76
 The 
jihadist indoctrination phase is typically led by a spiritual sanctioner (such as overseas 
propagandists like Anwar al-Awlaki) who allows these individuals to consistently 
intensify their beliefs. Acceptance of operational directives becomes the logical next step 
in a gradual process.
77
 
Though Al Qaeda‘s recruits in the US, like those of the UK, share certain ethnic 
characteristics or religious backgrounds, according to a 2010 report by the National 
Security Preparedness Group (NSPG), there is not a single demographic or social profile 
that predicts recruitment into the Al Qaeda organization or affiliated jihadist networks. 
Grassroots jihadists in the US appear to represent as diverse a range of individual 
backgrounds as they do in the UK, and some appear to have ethnic or familial ties to 
Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Whereas most grassroots jihadists in the UK 
appear to come from the country‘s Pakistani immigrant communities, American jihadists 
are primarily of Caucasian or Somali descent (21 and 31 percent respectively as of 
2009).
78
  
The latest wave of jihadist recruits also appears to have few if any familial or 
physical ties abroad. Carlos Bledsoe (African American convert to Islam, and Little Rock 
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Arkansas Army recruiting station shooter), Bryant Vinas (Hispanic American convert to 
Islam), Michael Finton (Caucasian American convert to Islam, who plotted an attack on 
the Springfield Illinois Federal Building), and Daniel Boyd (Caucasian American convert 
to Islam, charged with plotting attacks at home and abroad), are cases in point.
79
 With the 
only common factor being ideological commitment, there is little with which to tie 
together the increasingly diverse group of American recruits of the Al Qaeda network, 
regional groups, and affiliated insurgent movements. This suggests that the appeal of 
jihadist propaganda can transcend a strictly demographic or social basis in order to appeal 
to a narrow, unpredictable psychological profile. 
Thus despite the US ―melting pot‖ mentality of integrating various ethnic and 
religious groups, and despite the opportunities offered in the US, the pull of individuals‘ 
heritage or personal troubles appear to be enough to encourage a handful of individuals to 
self radicalize.
80
 Faisal Shazad, a Pakistani-American, father, husband, highly educated, 
and who lived in a middle class suburban home (fitting a similar profile as London 7/7 
cell leader Mohammad Sidique Khan, and Christmas Day bomber Farouk 
Abdulmutallab) is such a case. Despite apparent environmental differences between the 
US and UK, according to Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, conventional wisdom that 
the US could avoid the level of jihadist recruitment seen in the UK does not appear to 
hold. However, recent attention to this apparent rise in Al Qaeda recruitment over the 
past couple of years by US law enforcement and intelligence agencies may have curbed 
this increase.
81
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This being said, overall support for jihadism remains low amongst the American 
Muslim population. According to a 2009 Pew research report, most American Muslims 
are middle class and, unlike European Muslims, tend to be well educated and well 
integrated into American society. Only five percent were reported as having a favorable 
view toward Al Qaeda, and fewer than one in ten American Muslims believe that suicide 
bombing is justified.
82
 
While lacking in physical presence in the US, Al Qaeda is successfully exploiting 
its literal and ideological connections with individuals and affiliates to recruit Americans. 
Through its use of the internet, Al Qaeda is able to reach out to individuals despite 
apparent differences in British and American civil society. Al Qaeda‘s reliance on a 
diverse range of recruits and recruitment methods has been a major part of the 
organization‘s strategy. By focusing its efforts on smaller, more frequent attacks, Al 
Qaeda hopes to produce the economic and security overloading effects described in 
Chapter Two by grabbing the attention of domestic intelligence and police forces (and 
thus straining resources), and cultivating an overwhelming sense of fear within the host 
population (even with failed attacks).
83
 As Shazad and Zazi illustrate, these types of 
operations are typically less successful (though they do not really need to be). As in the 
UK, while affiliates maintain their own strategic objectives, there is a growing tendency 
for these groups to second their recruits to Al Qaeda (as was the case with Zazi) or even 
operate in ways that are mutually beneficial to both the affiliate and Al Qaeda (as was the 
case with Shazad). 
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Conclusion 
While the Al Qaeda network in the UK enjoys access to a wealth of social 
connections and affiliated groups, with tighter policing and intelligence measures in 
place, it is likely that Al Qaeda will continue to rely on cadres of secondary recruits 
which, although harder to track and less predictable, lack the operational capabilities of 
directly controlled Al Qaeda cells. As of 2006, British intelligence reports indicated that 
most threats within the UK come from individuals without any ties to Al Qaeda.
84
 
Nonetheless, because of its ability to inspire countless grassroots followers through the 
proliferation of its propaganda, Al Qaeda has links (whether accidental or intentional) to 
nearly every major recent terrorist plot in the UK.
85
 
The UK as a case study illustrates Al Qaeda‘s ability, given the environmental 
conditions described earlier in this chapter, to maintain a presence (albeit limited) in a 
developed state.  Thus despite a large, organized national police force, full control over 
territory, and the presence of some of the world‘s most adept domestic and foreign 
intelligence services, the presence of extremist groups provide a great deal of invisibility 
to Al Qaeda operatives, recruiters, or financiers. This same dynamic appears to also play 
out in the US. While certainly the US does not have the same sort of disenfranchised 
Pakistani immigrant communities seen in the UK, Al Qaeda has nonetheless proven 
willing and able to recruit Americans. 
 As US and NATO operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to deny Al 
Qaeda central safe haven in that region (though far from entirely), it is likely that Al 
Qaeda recruitment in the UK and the US will shift toward Al Qaeda‘s regional branches 
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or affiliated groups. As mentioned earlier, because US and British terrorists‘ familial and 
social connections abroad have facilitated their travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan, it 
remains to be seen whether Al Qaeda will be able to maintain its level of recruitment in 
the West as Al Qaeda central declines. While Al Qaeda‘s affiliates and regional groups 
appear, at least at the moment, to be successful in picking up the slack in recruitment, this 
is in no way guaranteed over the long term.
86
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Al Qaeda has utilized markedly different operational doctrines aimed at exploiting 
diverse environmental conditions in the UK, US and Yemen. This is illustrative of Al 
Qaeda‘s evolving organization and operational approach. As Al Qaeda central‘s 
command and control becomes more limited, the arms of its broader organization are 
operating autonomously as Al Qaeda evolves into a truly franchised organization. Despite 
the organization‘s apparent physical resilience, it also has a number of significant 
strategic weaknesses. 
In Yemen, AQAP has established a well organized, hierarchical, and resilient 
organization. AQAP not only maintains strategic and ideological connections to Al 
Qaeda central, but it has also proven capable of operating independently at a global level, 
allowing it to pick up recruitment where Al Qaeda central falls short. Factors that include 
the nature of Yemen‘s tribal communities, lack of centralized governance, preexisting 
jihadist networks, domestic unrest, and resulting access to weapons and an abundant 
source of potential recruits are the environmental variables that have allowed AQAP to 
establish such an integrated and visible presence. Of these factors, tribal grievances and 
the country‘s internal unrest are likely the most significant. However, Al Qaeda‘s long 
term strategic goals are inherently at odds with those of its local partners. By shedding 
these goals to maintain local relevance, the group stands to lose its Al Qaeda identity, 
though it will likely retain the ability to continue to launch global attacks against the 
West.  
In contrast to Yemen, Al Qaeda in the UK must rely on the full extent of its 
organization when it is denied the relatively unimpeded environmental access seen in 
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Yemen. These organizational arms have achieved operational and recruiting success 
primarily by exploiting Britain‘s various Muslim communities, Islamic organizations, 
and loopholes in national civil law. Familial ties to South Asia and political and social 
grievances are also key factors that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have exploited. Though 
there are some clear environmental differences between the UK and the US, such as 
Britain‘s secluded and disenfranchised Muslim communities, Al Qaeda has achieved the 
same level of success in recruiting in both theaters of operation. As in the US, individuals 
who subscribe to conservative Islamic ideology are more prone, though in no way 
guaranteed, to make the jump to more radical forms of Islam. However, as a result of UK 
counterterrorism efforts, Al Qaeda relies increasingly on ideologically inspired 
individuals with little or no ties to the organization.  
Given the difference in, and apparent success of Al Qaeda‘s penetration efforts in 
Yemen, the UK, and US, it is difficult to quantifiably compare these countries‘ 
environmental conditions in terms of their conduciveness to Al Qaeda‘s presence. 
Certainly states that rank low in governance and high on tribal networks allow a more 
structured presence to exist, as Yemen illustrates. However, Al Qaeda is able to adapt and 
establish a virtual or covert presence in countries that rank high in governance, and low 
for underlying insurgent, criminal, or tribal activity.  
Operational and recruiting trends in the UK and US (as with AQAP in Yemen) 
demonstrate the ability of Al Qaeda‘s organizational arms to operate as essentially 
independent entities while continuing to embrace Al Qaeda inspired ideology and limited 
objectives such as targeting Western interests. In the minds of senior Al Qaeda 
leadership, this is undoubtedly to ensure the survival of the organization.  It is also 
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indicative of an intentional operational shift. As recent plots illustrate, including those of 
Faisal Shazad and Farouk Abdulmutallab, operations are moving away from large scale 
9/11 sized attacks to smaller, more frequent, and ultimately less successful ones 
(swarming). Therefore, networking theory suggests that Al Qaeda is evolving into an 
increasingly diffuse, dynamic, full matrix network. The organization‘s ability to exploit 
the internet and spread propaganda at a global level ensures ideological influence across 
jihadist organizations, transforming it into what is effectively a social movement. As in 
dynamic networks, bonds, not leadership, are key, and the organization will remain 
impervious to the destruction of individual nodes.  
Considering this diffuse network, there is debate about the amount of control Al 
Qaeda central maintains. Certainly, as a number of cases in the UK and US illustrate, Al 
Qaeda does maintain control over at least a limited number of cells, although as Marc 
Sageman points out, this ability has been significantly mitigated due to recent 
counterterrorism operations.
1
 As the case study of AQAP illustrates, Al Qaeda provides 
strategic guidance while leaving operational specifics to leadership in Yemen.
2
 
Nonetheless, Al Qaeda does appear to be ―on the march‖ as Bruce Hoffman suggests, 
albeit as a diffuse organization with increasingly decentralized command and control 
delegated to its affiliates, regional groups, and the Al Qaeda network.
3
 
However with growth comes problems, and Al Qaeda faces a number of 
significant strategic weaknesses. As recent polls of the Muslim world indicate, Al 
                                                          
1
 Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, "Does Osama Still Call the Shots?" Foreign Affairs (July-August 
2008), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/64460. 
2
  Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda in Yemen: A New Foothold," interview by Kenneth Pollack, January 21, 2010, 
Brookings Institution. 
3
 Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, "Does Osama Still Call the Shots?" 
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Qaeda‘s popularity is declining globally. According to the NSPG, some religious scholars 
that were previously allied with Al Qaeda have turned against it. The Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group, previously loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda, publicly turned away from 
the organization in 2009.
4
 Thus, Al Qaeda is in danger of losing its cohesive identity 
(narrative). , 
As previously noted by Ronfeldt and Arquilla, narrative, doctrine, technological 
infrastructure, and social underpinnings are important factors in ensuring an 
organization‘s survival.5 At the doctrinal level, Al Qaeda‘s propensity for collateral 
damage appears to be hindering the organization‘s relevance as ―leader of the ummah‖. 
At the organizational level, by granting operational autonomy to its arms, Al Qaeda‘s 
increasingly diffuse structure risks further hindering its doctrinal position if these groups 
cause collateral damage. By ceding recruiting efforts to its regional branches and 
affiliates, Al Qaeda also loses a significant degree of operational control. In the case of 
AQAP in Yemen, Al Qaeda‘s regional branches may have to shed their hardliner Al 
Qaeda narrative to maintain local relevance. Yet, Al Qaeda‘s survival is dependent upon 
its ability to maintain global relevance. Though it has undoubtedly learned from its 
strategic failures in Iraq, Al Qaeda‘s long term vision of a global Islamic caliphate is 
inherently at odds with those of its partners. At a technological and social level, Al Qaeda 
appears, at least for the moment, to enjoy strength in both of these venues. Given the ease 
with which Al Qaeda exploits the internet, both by proliferating propaganda and by 
coordinating with individuals regardless of physical ties (like Nidal Hassan and Colleen 
                                                          
4
 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, Bi-Partisan Policy Center, Report of the 
National Security Preparedness Group, 21-22. 
5
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 327 
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LaRose), the organization will continue to maintain a global ideological presence. Even if 
the organization loses physical ground, it will continue to inspire affiliated movements.  
Al Qaeda‘s affiliates and regional groups may become operationally independent 
(as AQAP illustrates), and may even decide to abandon the Al Qaeda brand name 
altogether if it benefits them to do so. Nonetheless, they can continue to function and 
operate as Al Qaeda entities, such as by targeting the West, without actually being 
subsidiaries or affiliates of the organization. 
Implications for Al Qaeda’s Affiliates and Regional Branches 
As Al Qaeda‘s affiliates and regional groups become increasingly autonomous, 
this suggests, even in the absence of Al Qaeda sponsorship or leadership, that these 
groups will likely continue to operate against Western interests. While they may behave 
in the same way as Al Qaeda, they need not hold to the organization‘s global objectives 
or retain its ideology to make an impact or to maintain an ability to operate 
internationally. Pakistani Taliban‘s and AQAP‘s abilities to recruit, train, and deploy 
Westerners are indicative of this trend. Nonetheless, Al Qaeda‘s ability to coordinate 
recruiting and operational efforts with its regional groups and affiliates suggests that 
these groups (or Al Qaeda) may begin to branch out to and cooperate with non-Muslim 
insurgencies or international criminal networks as well. According to Jon Perdue at the 
Fund for American Studies, terrorist groups including Hezbollah and Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA), maintain either a significant connection to, or presence in South 
America. Hezbollah has raised money from both Middle Eastern immigrants and 
narcotrafickers in the region, while ETA has sent members to train in FARC terrorist 
camps in Columbia. Mexican drug cartels have also reportedly sent operatives to train in 
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Iran with the Revolutionary Guard Corps.
6
 Given the operational level of coordinated 
function and recruiting seen between Al Qaeda and its broader organization, with 
Najibullah Zazi and Mohammad Sidique Khan being just two examples, it is feasible that 
training could shift to additional third parties as well. For instance, an individual could be 
recruited by Pakistani Taliban (or any one of Al Qaeda‘s affiliates or regional branches), 
sent abroad to train with a non-Muslim criminal or insurgent group such as FARC, travel 
either to the group or recruit‘s country of origin, and then become operationally active. It 
could be operationally beneficial for affiliates and regional groups to shed some of Al 
Qaeda‘s more radical ideologies in order to establish cooperative ties beyond Muslim 
insurgent or terrorist movements. Therefore by taking advantage of the organization, 
political and structural elements set by Al Qaeda, groups that were once fundamentally 
franchised to the organization are now capable of acting independently of the network 
structure to spread their own message.   
 
                                                          
6
 Jon Perdue, "Radicalism South of the Border," Journal of International Security Affairs, no. 19 (Fall-
Winter 2010): 103-104. 
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